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We are going to frame our discussion around a
hypothetical fact situation. The buyer is an
acquisition entity ("Buyer") organized by a
Texas private equity financial buyer. The
target corporation is a Delaware corporation
("Target") headquartered in Manhattan and
owned by an extended and disjointed family
(now approximately 30 stockholders). Target
manufactures equipment at an old facility,
which it leases in Brooklyn. The term sheet
that the parties initially discussed, without the
benefit of counsel, contemplated a negotiated
sale for cash of all of the stock of Target to
Buyer.
My name is Byron Egan, and I am with the law
firm of Jackson Walker L.L.P. in Dallas. I will
be representing Buyer in this negotiation as
well as chairing this session. Target will be
represented by H. Lawrence ("Larry") Tafe III
of the law firm of Day Pitney LLP in Boston.
Michael Schler, of the law firm of Cravath,
Swaine & Moore LLP in New York, will be
the tax advisor and will help Larry understand
the tax consequences of the transaction.
Donald ("Don") Wolfe, of the law firm of
Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP in
Wilmington, will play the role of the Delaware
[Vol. 116:3744
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lawyer and will explain various Delaware
issues involved in the transaction. Richard
("Dick") De Rose, of the investment banking
firm of Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin in
New York, will explain this proposed
transaction from a financial perspective.
Frances Murphy, of the law firm of Slaughter
and May in London, will explain to us how the
deal would be different if it were done in
Europe.
Now, as often happens, Buyer has looked at the
term sheet with the benefit of counsel and has
realized that the transaction, as set forth in that
term sheet, is problematic from Buyer's
perspective. Based on my recommendations,
Buyer is going to propose that we restructure
this transaction from a stock sale to a sale of
assets, or perhaps some combination of both,
and is going to submit its form of asset
purchase agreement (the "Proposed
Agreement). 8





Byron, why at this stage are you proposing to
change the form of the transaction from a stock
purchase to an asset purchase?
Normally, a buyer is going to seek to buy
assets rather than stock for the simple reason
that when you buy stock, you inherit the
seller's accrued liabilities plus its contingent
and other liabilities, even undisclosed
liabilities. This is an inherent risk in any
purchase of stock that leads the buyer to prefer
to buy assets unless tax costs, regulatory issues,
8. See Byron F. Egan, Acquisition Agreement Issues, in 8th Annual Institute on
Corporate, Securities and Related Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, New York, N.Y.
(Oct. 14, 2011), at 28-298 [hereinafter Acquisition Agreement], available at
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/1662.pdf.
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or other considerations dictate otherwise.
Further, in the course of Buyer's due diligence
in this transaction, three problems that are
specific to this deal have surfaced:
FIRST, the hypothetical fact pattern assumes
that Target's stock is owned by a dysfunctional
family that now numbers approximately 30
shareholders. There is no way that Buyer is
going to be able to get all 30 shareholders to
sign the same stock purchase agreement. Thus,
if the transaction were structured as a
negotiated stock purchase, Buyer would run the
risk of being left with minority shareholders
whose interests it would have to consider and
to whom it might owe fiduciary duties.9 In
addition to not wanting to deal with minority
shareholders, Buyer as the controlling
shareholder does not want to owe any fiduciary
duties to the minority shareholders,10 and the
people that Buyer wants to put on the board of
directors (the "Board") of the acquiring entity
certainly do not want to owe any duties to any
minority shareholders. Further, Buyer is going
to need to finance this transaction. Its lenders
are going to require that Buyer pledge all of the
assets of the purchased enterprise to secure the
purchase money loan. If Buyer leaves a
minority interest, Buyer may have fiduciary
duty of loyalty issues in pledging Target's
assets to secure Buyer's purchase money
debt."
SECOND, there are the environmental issues.
If Buyer became the holder of the lease and the
operator of the facility, Buyer could have state
9. See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Cases Affect Advice to Directors and
Officers and Delaware and Texas Corporations, in 34th Annual Conference on Securities
Regulation and Business Law, Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 10, 2012), at 11-38 [hereinafter





and federal environmental liability exposure
and would prefer to avoid that risk.12  Since
Buyer will not really need the leased facility
post-acquisition, Buyer would prefer to buy the
intellectual property and certain other assets of
Target and leave the leased facility with
Target.
THIRD, as Buyer has done its due diligence,
Buyer has found certain sloppiness in Target's
operations, and believes that there is a
substantial risk that contingent liabilities and
other problems are going to surface as it gets
further into the due diligence process. Buyer
wishes to eliminate its exposure to those
potential liabilities by leaving them with
Target.
Buyer can solve these problems if it leaves
Target with the lease and the environmental
liabilities. Buyer proposes to take the
equipment and the intellectual property,
including the patents, copyrights, and license
agreements. Then, under the Delaware
General Corporation Law (the "DGCL"), a
majority stockholder vote (assuming a
stockholder vote was required) could approve
the asset sale and there would be no dissenter's
rights.13  So we regard an asset purchase as a
very simple transaction, and think that is the
appropriate structure for this acquisition.
RICHARD De ROSE: So that sounds pretty good from Buyer's
(Investment Banker) perspective. Larry, what's your preliminary
reaction to this proposal?
12. See Byron F. Egan, Asset Acquisitions: Assuming and Avoiding Liabilities, 116
PENN ST. L. REV. 913, 945-47 (2012).
13. According to DGCL § 271, a corporation may sell all or substantially all of its
assets upon such terms as its board of directors deems to be in the best interests of the
corporation when authorized by the holders of not less than a majority of the
corporation's outstanding voting shares. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 271 (2011); id
§ 262.
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The problem is it just isn't the deal we made. I
want to be sure that when all the dust settles,
we have the same deal that we had on the term
sheet in substance, and I do not think this
proposal is going to get that here.
I would like to respond briefly to the three
points Byron makes. He doesn't think we can
get 100% of the stockholders to sign a stock
purchase agreement. While this family is
disjointed and dysfunctional, as Byron has
said, it is not stupid. If this is a good deal, a
majority can agree to sell their stock; and then
Buyer can have a merger to get the remaining
shares and avoid being burdened with minority
shareholders.
As far as the environmental issues are
concerned, Target is for sale as a company in
the whole, not in pieces, and the costs of
environmental claims can be addressed through
indemnification.
The differences between the tax consequences
of an asset transaction and a stock deal can be
substantial, and Target needs advice from its
tax advisor as to the tax consequences of an
asset sale versus a stock sale. I also need some
advice from the investment bankers to compare
the value of what we are being asked to take
now compared to what the term sheet
contemplated. Finally, I need Don Wolfe to
tell me something about the Delaware law
consequences of an asset deal, particularly the
stockholder approval requirements.
From an investment banker's perspective,
divestitures (which are essentially private
company transactions) actually constitute about
a third of overall M&A activity in both good
and bad economic conditions. Last year, in the
U.S., divestitures aggregated about $280
748 [Vol. 116:3
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billion dollars, which was roughly 34% of
activity by value and about 31% by number.
Similarly in Europe, that activity was about
$236 billion, which represented about 40% in
value and about 32% in the number of
transactions.
Divestitures have some interesting issues
associated with them. The first is really
defining the business that is being sold and the
assets that go with that business. That is less of
an issue in this case because we are dealing
with a standalone company; however, many
private company deals are divestitures of
divisions or newly created subsidiaries, where
the issue of defining the business is more
important.14 The other issue associated with a
divestiture is that once you have defined the
business, you have to assess the ability of that
business to operate on a standalone basis.
Advance planning is important because any
surprises that show up, especially in the
context of an auction, are going to have the
effect of slowing down the process. Surprises
can undermine the positioning of the business,
and ultimately may lessen the seller's
negotiating leverage.
Shared assets can be a big issue.15 The buyer
will want certainty that it is getting all the
assets that it needs to operate the purchased
business. On the other hand, the seller is going
to want to try to limit the assets to be
transferred to those that are used either
"exclusively" or "primarily" in the operation of
the business. Sometimes this is simple. Often,
it gets very complicated because you may have
material assets, things like a factory or
14. See Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, app. D at 1-2.
15. See id. at 5-8.
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intellectual property, which are used both by
the business that is being sold and by the other
businesses that are going to remain with the
seller.
Similarly, shared services, like treasury, legal,
or tax, may have traditionally been provided by
the corporate parent to its subsidiaries and
divisions. The costs of these services are rarely
allocated on the basis of actual cost and even
the audited financial statements will not
necessarily reflect the cost of providing these
services on a standalone basis.
Frequently, a private equity buyer, such as we
have here, is not going to be able to replicate
those services right away. Larry and Byron are
probably going to have to negotiate a
Transition Services Agreement pursuant to
which Larry's client will provide these
services, say for six months, nine months, or a
year, until the private equity firm can replicate
them on its own.16
Having defined the business and the assets, the
next major issue is the choice between a stock
and asset deal. Here, the two principal drivers
are taxes and liabilities. From a tax
perspective, buyers are always going to prefer
an asset purchase deal because it gives them
the opportunity to allocate the purchase price
among the assets being purchased to reflect
their fair market value.' 7 This results in a step-
up of tax basis and allows higher depreciation
and amortization deductions going forward,
and hence future tax savings. By contrast, in a
stock deal, all the tax attributes of the acquired
company will carry over and the buyer will
lose that ability to step up and achieve a new
16. See id. at 11-21.
17. See Asset Acquisitions, supra note 12, at 926-29.
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level of depreciation and amortization
deductions from the assets. Consequently,
buyers tend to be willing to pay more for assets
than stock.
The downside of an asset deal from the seller's
perspective is that there is the specter of double
taxation. Unless there is a sufficient amount of
net operating losses at the acquired company,
the corporation is going to recognize taxable
gain on the sale, and then when the proceeds
are distributed up to the shareholders there will
be a second level of taxation, which is very
undesirable from the seller's perspective.
The other key issue is liabilities. In a stock
transaction, the business is bought "as-is,
where-is." The buyer inherits all the
obligations, contingent and otherwise, known
and unknown, for things like taxes, pensions,
and environmental liabilities. By contrast, in
an asset purchase, with certain limitations, a
buyer can pretty much cherry pick the
liabilities it wants to assume.'8
18. Section 2.4 of Buyer's Proposed Agreement provides as follows:
2.4 Liabilities
(a) Assumed Liabilities. On the Closing Date, but effective as of the Effective
Time, Buyer shall assume and agree to discharge only the following Liabilities
of Seller (the "Assumed Liabilities"):
(i) any trade account payable reflected on the Interim Balance Sheet
(other than a trade account payable to any Shareholder or a Related Person
of Seller) which remain unpaid at and are not delinquent as of the
Effective Time;
(ii) any trade account payable (other than a trade account payable to any
Shareholder or a Related Person of Seller) that have been incurred by
Seller in the Ordinary Course of Business between the date of the Interim
Balance Sheet and the Closing Date which remains unpaid at and are not
delinquent as of the Effective Time;
(iii) any Liability to Seller's customers incurred by Seller in the Ordinary
Course of Business for non-delinquent orders outstanding as of the
Effective Time reflected on Seller's books (other than any Liability arising
out of or relating to a Breach which occurred prior to the Effective Time);
(iv) any Liability to Seller's customers under written warranty agreements
in the forms disclosed in Part 2.4(a)(iv) given by Seller to its customers in
the Ordinary Course of Business prior to the Effective Time (other than
2012]1 751
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any Liability arising out of or relating to a Breach which occurred prior to
the Effective Time);
(v) any Liability arising after the Effective Time under the Seller
Contracts described in Part 3.20(a) (other than any Liability arising under
the Seller Contracts described on Part 2.4(a)(v) or arising out of or relating
to a Breach which occurred prior to the Effective Time);
(vi) any Liability of Seller arising after the Effective Time under any
Seller Contract included in the Assets which is entered into by Seller after
the date hereof in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement (other
than any Liability arising out of or relating to a Breach which occurred
prior to the Effective Time); and
(vii) any Liability of Seller described on Part 2.4(a)(vii).
(b) Retained Liabilities. The Retained Liabilities shall remain the sole
responsibility of and shall be retained, paid, performed and discharged solely
by Seller. "Retained Liabilities" shall mean every Liability of Seller other
than the Assumed Liabilities, including:
(i) any Liability arising out of or relating to products of Seller to the
extent manufactured or sold prior to the Effective Time other than to the
extent assumed under Section 2.4(a)(iii), (iv) or (v);
(ii) any Liability under any Contract assumed by Buyer pursuant to
Section 2.4(a) which arises after the Effective Time but which arises out
of or relates to any Breach that occurred prior to the Effective Time;
(iii) any Liability for Taxes, including (A) any Taxes arising as a result of
Seller's operation of its business or ownership of the Assets prior to the
Effective Time, (B) any Taxes that will arise as a result of the sale of the
Assets pursuant to this Agreement and (C) any deferred Taxes of any
nature;
(iv) any Liability under any Contract not assumed by Buyer under Section
2.4(a), including any Liability arising out of or relating to Seller's credit
facilities or any security interest related thereto;
(v) any Environmental, Health and Safety Liabilities arising out of or
relating to the operation of Seller's business or Seller's leasing, ownership
or operation of real property;
(vi) any Liability under the Employee Plans or relating to payroll,
vacation, sick leave, worker's compensation, unemployment benefits,
pension benefits, employee stock option or profit-sharing plans, health
care plans or benefits, or any other employee plans or benefits of any kind
for Seller's employees or former employees, or both;
(vii) any Liability under any employment, severance, retention or
termination agreement with any employee of Seller or any of its Related
Persons;
(viii) any Liability arising out of or relating to any employee grievance
whether or not the affected employees are hired by Buyer;
(ix) any Liability of Seller to any Shareholder or Related Person of Seller
or any Shareholder;
(x) any Liability to indemnify, reimburse or advance amounts to any
officer, director, employee or agent of Seller;
(xi) any Liability to distribute to any of Seller's shareholders or otherwise
apply all or any part of the consideration received hereunder;
(xii) any Liability arising out of any Proceeding pending as of the
Effective Time, whether or not set forth in the Disclosure Letter;
(xiii) any Liability arising out of any Proceeding commenced after the
Effective Time and arising out of, or relating to, any occurrence or event
happening prior to the Effective Time;
752 [Vol. 116:3
PRIVATE COMPANY ACQUISITIONS
Here, with respect to liabilities, one of the
issues the parties are going to face in the
negotiation is whether the environmental
liabilities are sufficiently large to cause
concern under both federal and state fraudulent
conveyance laws.' 9 These are a set of laws
really designed to protect creditors of a
company and it allows a transaction to be
avoided by a creditor or a trustee in
bankruptcy2 0 if the transfer was effectuated
(xiv) any Liability arising out of or resulting from Seller's non-
compliance with any Legal Requirement or Order of any Governmental
Body;
(xv) any Liability of Seller under this Agreement or any other document
executed in connection with the Contemplated Transactions; and
(xvi) any Liability of Seller based upon Seller's acts or omissions
occurring after the Effective Time.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 64-66.
19. Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, provides the following regarding
fraudulent transfers:
Most jurisdictions have statutory provisions relating to fraudulent conveyances
or transfers. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") and Section 548
of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") generally
provide that a "transfer" is voidable by a creditor if the transfer is made (i) with
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor or (ii) if the transfer leaves
the debtor insolvent, undercapitalized or unable to pay its debts as they mature,
and is not made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value. If a transfer is
found to be fraudulent, courts have wide discretion in fashioning an appropriate
remedy, and could enter judgment against the transferee for the value of the
property, require the transferee to return the property to the transferor or a
creditor of the transferor, or exercise any other equitable relief as the
circumstances may require. If a good faith transferee gave some value to the
transferor in exchange for the property, the transferee may be entitled to a
corresponding reduction of the judgment on the fraudulent transfer, or a lien on
the property if the court requires its return to the transferor. If the transferor
liquidates or distributes assets to its shareholders after the transaction, a court
could collapse the transaction and hold that the transferor did not receive any
consideration for the assets and that the transferor did not receive reasonably
equivalent value for the transfer. See Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94
B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The statute of limitations on a fraudulent transfer
action can be as long as six years under some states' versions of the UFTA.
Id. at 153.
20. Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, provides the following explanation
regarding the remedies available to a creditor in a fraudulent transfer:
The remedies available to a creditor in a fraudulent transfer action include entry
of judgment against the transferee for the value of the property at the time it
was transferred, entry of an order requiring return of the property to the
transferor for satisfaction of creditors' claims, or any other relief the
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with either intentional or constructive fraud.2 1
Given that intent is very difficult to prove,
most fraudulent conveyance claims rely on
constructive fraud, which requires proof that
the transfer was not made for "reasonably
equivalent value," and that the transfer
otherwise left the target insolvent,2 2
circumstances may require. UFTA §§ 7(a), 8(b). Courts have wide discretion
in fashioning appropriate remedies.
Even if a transfer is voidable under the UFTA, a good faith transferee is
entitled under UFTA § 8, to the extent of the value given to the transferor, to
(a) a lien on or right to retain an interest in the asset transferred;
(b) enforcement of the note or other obligation incurred; or (c) reduction in the
amount of the liability on the judgment against the transferee in favor of the
creditor. UFTA § 8(d)(1)-(3). If the value paid by the transferee was not
received by the transferor, the good faith transferee would not be entitled to the
rights specified in the preceding sentence. If the transferor distributed the
proceeds of sale, in liquidation or otherwise to its equity holders, a court could
collapse the transaction and find that the proceeds were not received by the
transferor, thereby depriving the good faith transferee of the rights to offset the
value it paid against a fraudulent transfer recovery. With this in mind, a buyer
may seek to require that the seller pay all of its retained liabilities prior to
making any distribution, in liquidation or otherwise, to its equity holders.
Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
21. Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, outlines the remedies and protections under
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) as follows:
UFTA is structured to provide remedies for creditors in specified situations
when a debtor "transfers" assets in violation of UFTA. A "creditor" entitled to
bring a fraudulent transfer action is broadly defined as a person who has "a
right to payment or property, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Persons which could be
included as creditors under the statute include: noteholders, lessees on capital
leases or operating leases, litigants with claims against the seller that have not
proceeded to judgment, employees with underfunded pension plans and persons
holding claims which have not yet been asserted. There is a presumption of
insolvency when the debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become
due.
The UFTA avoidance provisions are divided between those avoidable to
creditors holding claims at the time of the transfer in issue, and those whose
claims arose after the transfer. The statute is less protective of a creditor who
began doing business with a debtor after the debtor made the transfer rendering
it insolvent. Most fraudulent transfer actions, however, are brought by a
bankruptcy trustee, who under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994), can use the avoiding powers of any actual creditor
holding an unsecured claim who could avoid the transfer under applicable non-
bankruptcy law.
Id. at 149-50.
22. Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, provides the following discussion
regarding the valuation of debts:
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undercapitalized, or unable to pay its debts as
they become mature.23 Fraudulent conveyance
A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the
debtor's assets at a fair valuation. A significant body of law under the
Bankruptcy Code interprets the phrase "at a fair valuation" to mean the amount
that could be obtained for the property within a reasonable time by a capable
and diligent business person from an interested buyer who is willing to
purchase the assets under ordinary selling conditions. A "fair valuation" is not
the amount that would be realized by the debtor if it was instantly forced to
dispose of the assets or the amount that could be realized from a protracted
search for a buyer under special circumstances or having a particular ability to
use the assets. For a business which is a going concern, it is proper to make a
valuation of the assets as a going concern, and not on an item-by-item basis.
Id.
23. Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, explains asset transfer violations under the
UFTA as follows:
An asset transfer would be in violation of UFTA § 4(a)(1), and would be
fraudulent if the transfer was made "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any creditor of the debtor." If "actual intent" is found, it does not
matter if value was given in exchange for the assets, or if the seller was solvent.
A number of factors (commonly referred to as "badges of fraud") which are to
be considered in determining actual intent under UFTA § 4(a)(1) are set out in
UFTA § 4(b), and include whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had
been sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; ... [and]
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt
was incurred.
Although the existence of one or more "badges of fraud" may not be sufficient
to establish actual fraudulent intent, "the confluence of several can constitute
conclusive evidence of an actual intent to defraud, absent 'significantly clear'
evidence of a legitimate, supervening purpose." Max Sugarman Funeral
Home, Inc. v. A.D.B. Investors, 926 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (1st Cir. 1991).
An asset purchase may be found to be fraudulent if it was effected by the seller
"without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation," and:
(A) the seller's remaining assets, after the transaction, were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction that the seller was engaged
in or was about to engage in, or
(B) the seller intended to incur, or believed (or should have believed) that
it would incur, debts beyond its ability to pay as they became due.
The "unreasonably small assets" test is a distinct concept from insolvency and
is not specifically defined by statute. In applying the unreasonably small assets
test, a court may inquire whether the seller "has the ability to generate
sufficient cash flow on the date of transfer to sustain its operations." See In re
WCC Holding Corp., 171 B.R. 972, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994). In pursuing
such an inquiry, a court will not ask whether the transferor's cash flow
7552012]
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laws do apply to leveraged asset acquisitions
where the proceeds are distributed for
24shareholders of the acquired company.
The interesting dilemma that we face here is
that if Buyer succeeds in getting an asset
acquisition structure, the argument by
creditors, including the Environmental
Protection Agency, is going to be that Buyer
did such a good job in negotiation that the
assets were sold for less than reasonably
equivalent value, and given the size of the
environmental liability, the sale rendered the
remaining business of Target insolvent.2 5 To
reduce the fraudulent transfer risk Buyer could
get a solvency opinion that, based on the rules
and procedures outlined therein, concludes that
the transaction would not be a fraudulent
transaction,26 or a third party appraisal of the
assets to be transferred which confirms that
reasonably equivalent value was to be given for
the assets transferred.2 7
Buyer could also seek a representation from
Seller such as Section 3.32 of the Proposed
Agreement2 8 that negates the factual elements
projections later proved to be correct, but whether they were reasonable and
prudent at the time they were made.
Id. at 150.
24. See Robert J. Steam, Jr. & Cory D. Kandestin, Delaware's Solvency Test: What
Is It and Does It Make Sense? A Comparison of Solvency Tests Under the Bankruptcy
Code and Delaware Law, 36 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 165 (2011).
25. See id.
26. See Robert J. Steam, Jr., Proving Solvency: Defending Preference and
Fraudulent Transfer Litigation, 62 Bus. LAW. 359 (2007).
27. See Brown v. Third Nat'l Bank (In re Sherman), 67 F.3d 1348 (8th Cir. 1995).
28. Section 3.32 of Buyer's Proposed Agreement provides as follows:
3.32 Solvency
(a) Seller is not now insolvent, and will not be rendered insolvent by any of the
Contemplated Transactions. As used in this Section, "insolvent" means that the
sum Seller's debts and other probable Liabilities exceeds the present fair
saleable value of Seller's assets.
(b) Immediately after giving effect to the consummation of the Contemplated
Transactions, (i) Seller will be able to pay its Liabilities as they become due in
the usual course of its business, (ii) Seller will not have unreasonably small
756 [Vol. 116:3
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of a fraudulent transfer and is intended to
provide evidence of Seller's sound financial
condition and Buyer's good faith. Such a
representation may affect the defenses
available to Buyer in a fraudulent transfer
action, although conclusionary statements in an
asset purchase agreement would be of limited
value if not supported by the facts.
So at the end, despite Buyer's preference for an
asset deal, there are some other factors that
limit the structure's usefulness in reducing the
liabilities to which Buyer could become
subject. Apart from these issues, an asset
purchase often requires third-party consents,
leases, contracts, and permits. 29 This can open
up the opportunity for a counterparty to
renegotiate what would otherwise be a very
favorable contract.
In addition, there are a lot of mechanics for
transfers, documentations, recording taxes, and
the like, and as a result, asset deals are much
less prevalent. Houlihan Lokey's annual
purchase agreement study has shown that from
2002 to 2009, only 18% of the transactions
done were asset purchases. Mike, do you want
to pick up some of the tax issues?
MICHAEL SCHLER: From a tax perspective, the most important
(Tax Counsel) thing is to consult your tax lawyer early and
capital with which to conduct its present or proposed business, (iii) Seller will
have assets (calculated at fair market value) that exceed its Liabilities and
(iv) taking into account all pending and threatened litigation, final judgments
against Seller in actions for money damages are not reasonably anticipated to
be rendered at a time when, or in amounts such that, Seller will be unable to
satisfy any such judgments promptly in accordance with their terms (taking into
account the maximum probable amount of such judgments in any such actions
and the earliest reasonable time at which such judgments might be rendered) as
well as all other obligations of Seller. The cash available to Seller, after taking
into account all other anticipated uses of the cash, will be sufficient to pay all
such debts and judgments promptly in accordance with their terms.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 148.
29. See id. at 7-8.
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often in every transaction. The parties failed
here by having the term sheet go out without
tax advice. It is important to get the tax lawyer
involved at the early stages and keep him or
her involved at all points because everything
that you might think is a minor change in the
deal could have disastrous tax consequences to
one side or the other.
People say they will do the acquisition by way
of a merger. 30  For a tax lawyer, that is a
meaningless statement because the tax question
is: Which way does the merger go-forward
or reverse? If the target merges into the
acquiring company or into a subsidiary of the
acquiring company, that is an asset sale for tax
purposes, and that has all the tax consequences
of an asset sale. If the acquiring company sets
up a subsidiary that merges into the target, then
that is a stock purchase for tax purposes, and it
has all of the consequences of a stock purchase.
A forward and reverse triangular merger are
completely different transactions for tax
purposes.
If the target is a C-corporation, which is a
regular taxable corporation under the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"'), and the target
corporation does an asset sale, there is going to
be a corporate-level tax on the gain.3 1 That is a
35% federal tax, plus in this case, New York
state and New York City taxes (probably the
highest in the country combined), so these
corporate taxes probably aggregate over 40%
net when you take into account the fact that
state and local taxes are deductible for federal
income tax purposes. Additionally, the
shareholders pay taxes on the amounts
distributed to them, which can amount to




another 15% federal tax and probably another
10% state and local tax. The seller is not left
with a whole lot of money, if you have any
amount of gain, after it has paid all those taxes
at both levels.
On the other hand, if the transaction is treated
as a stock sale for tax purposes, whether it is a
real stock sale or a merger that is treated as a
stock sale, then all you have is the shareholder-
level tax, which is capital gains tax at the
shareholder level, and the seller has saved that
40% corporate-level tax. It makes a big
difference to the seller.
There is a tax advantage for the buyer of
buying assets as compared to buying stock
because the buyer gets a stepped-up basis in
the assets, and it gets to amortize the full cost
of the assets rather than whatever the existing
tax basis is. Some of that will be amortizable
over five to seven years for equipment, but
often most of the step-up is amortizable over
15 years if it is an intangible asset like
goodwill. So the buyer gets the benefit over 15
years, but the seller has all this upfront tax cost.
Thus, on a net basis, there's a lot more being
paid to the Internal Revenue Service (the
"IRS") for an asset sale than a stock sale.
In reality, you are effectively in a partnership
with the IRS; for any deal, it is the buyer, the
seller, and the IRS. The name of the game is
first to minimize what the IRS gets-that
maximizes what is left for the other parties.
Then the parties can negotiate how they want
to divide up what is left, but if the IRS is taking
a bigger slice off the top, there is a lot less to
divide up between the parties and everybody
but the IRS is worse off.
If taxes are the only consideration, first you try
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to minimize the total taxes on everybody and
then you negotiate to divide up what is left.
The fact that one party is better off one way
and the other party is better off the other way is
almost irrelevant. It is a question of what
minimizes the total and then who gets the
benefit of that.
As the result of this, if the selling corporation
is a C-corporation and taxes are the only
structuring consideration, you almost always
do a stock sale rather than an asset sale. In a
relatively closely held business, if all the
shareholders are individuals, it is possible that
the selling corporation is an S-corporation,
which is a pass-through entity, much like a
partnership. In that case, there is no separate
tax on the corporation itself, so from an income
tax point of view, the parties may end up in the
same place doing a stock sale or an asset sale.
The seller will end up in the same place
because there is not that extra level of
corporate tax. The corporate level gain passes
through to the shareholder and that gain
reduces the gain on the liquidation of the
company and the distribution of the cash, so
the total taxable gain to the seller is the same,
generally. The seller may be indifferent in that
case to a stock sale or an asset sale, in which
case the buyer will still prefer an asset
purchase to get the step up in basis on the
assets. In that case, since the seller is
indifferent and the buyer prefers an asset
purchase, you almost always do an asset deal
or something treated as an asset deal for tax
purposes.
Just one last thing. If you do want to do
something that is an asset deal for tax purposes,
there are different ways of doing it. You can
do a traditional asset sale. You can do a







company or into a subsidiary of the acquiring
company that is treated as an asset sale for tax
purposes. Alternatively, you can have the
target drop the assets to be sold into a wholly
owned limited liability company ("LLC"),
which can be done in advance of the closing to
make the day of closing mechanics easier.
Then on the closing, just sell the equity in the
LLC. The LLC is treated as a "disregarded
entity" for tax purposes, as if it is not there, so
when you sell the equity, it is treated like
selling assets for tax purposes, and both parties
get exactly the same tax treatment as if they
were selling assets.32
Or suppose it is an S-corporation and you
would rather in form sell stock because it is
mechanically easier to sell stock than to sell
assets. There is an IRC § 338(h)(10) election
that the parties can make where, if both parties
agree and it is an S-corporation, in form they
can sell stock, but it is treated for tax purposes
as if it was a sale of assets by the corporation
followed by a liquidation of the corporation.
There are really two issues: (i) whether you
want the transaction treated as a stock sale or
asset sale for tax purposes and (ii) depending
on the answer to (i), which is the best corporate
way to get to the desired result.
Don, tell us about some of the issues that will
be faced under DGCL.
One is the appraisal issue. Byron wants a sale
of assets, in part because he fears that there
will be a post-closing appraisal proceeding in a
merger, which may be correct. In a cash
merger under the DGCL, appraisal rights are
going to arise for stockholders who do not vote
32. See Michael L. Schler, Basic Tax Issues in Acquisition Transactions, 116 PENN
ST. L. REV. 879, 894 (discussing dropdown of assets to LLC and sale of LLC interests).
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in favor of the merger, and that would not be
the case in a sale of assets.3 3 But the appraisal
process is not. a particularly user-friendly
process. The DGCL statutory proceeding
imposes filing requirements and deadlines that
are strictly enforced.34  An appraisal
proceeding is not something that can be
invoked successfully on a whim or a reflex.
Also, while the petitioners in an appraisal
action can expect to share fees pro rata with
other petitioners, if there were any, they are not
going to be able to shift fees to the company as
they might in typical class action shareholder
litigation, and those expenses are likely to be
large. An expert witness on valuation is going
to be required. The case is likely to go to trial
in the absence of a settlement as an appraisal
action does not lend itself to summary
judgment. Thus, from a cost and timing
standpoint, a DGCL appraisal proceeding is not
an attractive strategy unless there are lots of
shares and dollars involved, there is much
potential upside in the price of the stock, and
there are lots of petitioners who have perfected
their appraisal rights.
Well, if Larry wishes to assume that risk and
indemnify us for any costs of an appraisal
proceeding and for any additional
consideration that Buyer might have to pay as a
result of the appraisal proceeding, then we
might take Delaware counsel's advice that
appraisal is a risk that Buyer could run.
Let us talk about stockholder approval in a
merger structure. Buyer is apparently
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2011); see Fiduciary Duty Cases, supra note
9, at 361-68.
34. Fiduciary Duty Cases, supra note 9, at 361-68.
35. DGCL §§ 251-58 permit corporations to merge with other corporations if their
Boards adopt resolutions approving a plan of merger and the requisite shareholder
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concerned about the uncertainty and risk of
another bidder seeking to upset the agreed deal
while we await shareholder approval of a
merger. 6 This concern is understandable
given a number of holdings, including
Omnicare,n invalidating a locked up deal upon
approval is obtained. Tit. 8, §§ 251-58. DGCL § 251(c) provides that mergers may be
approved by a vote of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares. Id § 251(c).
DGCL § 251(f) permits a merger to be effected without shareholder approval if the
corporation is the sole surviving corporation, the shares of stock of the corporation are
not changed as a result of the merger and the total number of shares of stock issued
pursuant to the merger does not exceed 20% of the shares of the corporation outstanding
immediately prior to the merger. Id. § 251 (f).
36. Under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986), director fiduciary duties require robust director involvement in sale of control
transactions to confirm that the stockholders are getting the best price reasonably
available. Directors fiduciary duties are applicable in the case of closely held
corporations as well as corporations whose securities are publicly traded, although the
conduct required to satisfy their fiduciary duties will be measured with reference to what
is reasonable in the context. See In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., No.
6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011); Transcript of Oral Argument,
Optima Int'l of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc., No. 3833-VCL (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008)
[hereinafter Optima Transcript], available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/
files/ 0702120713 001.pdf; Julian v. Eastern States Constr. Serv., Inc., No. 1892-VCP,
2008 WL 2673300 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2008); Byron F. Egan, Fiduciary Duties of
Corporate Directors and Officers in Texas, 43 TEX. J. Bus. L. 45, 182-183 (Spring 2009),
available at http://www.jw.com/site/jsp/publicationinfo.jsp?id=1230. Revlon does not
apply to a sale of assets, including the sale of a subsidiary, unless the transaction involves
a sale of control of the company. Even where Revlon is not applicable, the directors'
fiduciary duty of care still requires directors to use informed business judgment to
maximize value in a sale of assets. See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch.
2008). Even in a friendly acquisition, a board's obligations to maximize shareholder
values does not cease with the execution of the merger agreement. If a competing
acquiror emerges with a serious proposal offering greater value to shareholders (usually a
higher price), the board should give it due consideration. A board should seek to
maximize its flexibility in responding to a competing bidder by including in the purchase
agreement provisions permitting the corporation not only to provide information to a
bidder with a superior proposal,.but also to negotiate with the bidder, enter into a
definitive agreement with the bidder and terminate the existing merger agreement upon
the payment of a break-up fee. See Fiduciary Duty Cases, supra note 9, at 157-59, 243-
56.
37. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003), dealt with
the interrelationship between a provision in the merger agreement obligating the board to
submit the deal to the stockholders (also known as a "force the vote" provision), even if
the board subsequently withdraws its recommendation to the stockholders as permitted
by DGCL § 146, a voting agreement which essentially obligated a majority of the voting
power of the target company's shares to vote in favor of a merger, and the absence of a
"fiduciary termination right" in the merger agreement that would have enabled the board
of directors to back out of the deal before the merger vote if a better deal comes along.
The decision in Omnicare considered a challenge to a pending merger agreement
between NCS Healthcare, Inc. and Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. Id. at 917-18. Prior to
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entering into the Genesis merger agreement, the NCS directors were aware that Omnicare
was interested in acquiring NCS. Id. at 921. In fact, Omnicare had previously submitted
proposals to acquire NCS in a pre-packaged bankruptcy transaction. Id. NCS, however,
entered into an exclusivity agreement with Genesis in early July 2002. Id at 922-23.
When Omnicare learned from other sources that NCS was negotiating with Genesis and
that the parties were close to a deal, it submitted an offer that would have paid NCS
stockholders $3.00 cash per share, which was more than three times the value of the
$0.90 per share, all stock, proposal NCS was then negotiating with Genesis. Id. at 924.
Omnicare's proposal was conditioned upon negotiation of a definitive merger agreement,
obtaining required third party consents, and completing its due diligence. Id. The
exclusivity agreement with Genesis, however, prevented NCS from discussing the
proposal with Omnicare. Id
When NCS disclosed the Omnicare offer to Genesis, Genesis responded by
enhancing its offer. Id at 924-25. The enhanced terms included an increase in the
exchange ratio so that each NCS share would be exchanged for Genesis stock then valued
at $1.60 per share. Id. But Genesis also insisted that NCS approve and sign the merger
agreement as well as approve and secure the voting agreements by midnight the next day,
before the exclusivity agreement with Genesis was scheduled to expire. Id. at 925. On
July 28, 2002, the NCS directors approved the Genesis merger agreement prior to the
expiration of Genesis's deadline. Id.
The merger agreement contained a "force the vote" provision authorized by DGCL
§ 146 which required the agreement to be submitted to a vote of NCS's stockholders,
even if its board of directors later withdrew its recommendation of the merger (which the
NCS board later did). Id In addition, two NCS director-stockholders who collectively
held a majority of the voting power, agreed unconditionally and at the insistence of
Genesis to vote all of their shares in favor of the Genesis merger. Id at 926. The NCS
board authorized NCS to become a party to the voting agreements and granted approval
under DGCL § 203, in order to permit Genesis to become an interested stockholder for
purposes of that statute. Id. The "force the vote" provision and the voting agreements,
which together operated to ensure consummation of the Genesis merger, were not subject
to fiduciary outs. Id
The Supreme Court of Delaware accepted the Court of Chancery's finding that the
NCS directors were disinterested and independent and assumed "arguendo" that they
exercised due care in approving the Genesis merger. Id. at 929. Nonetheless, the
majority held that the "force the vote" provision in the merger agreement and the voting
agreements operated in tandem to irrevocably "lock up" the merger and to preclude the
NCS board from exercising its ongoing obligation to consider and accept higher bids. Id.
at 936. Because the merger agreement did not contain a fiduciary out, the Supreme Court
held that the Genesis merger agreement was both preclusive and coercive and, therefore,
invalid under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936-39. As an alternative basis for its conclusion, the majority
held that under the circumstances the NCS board did not have authority under Delaware
law to completely "lock up" the transaction because the defensive measures "completely
prevented the board from discharging its fiduciary responsibilities to the minority
stockholders when Omnicare presented its superior transaction." Id. at 936. In so
holding, the Court relied on its prior holding in Paramount Commcunnications, Inc. v.
Q VC Network, Inc. that "[t]o the extent that a [merger] contract, or a provision thereof,
purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of
fiduciary duties, it is invalid and unenforceable." Id (quoting Paramount Commc'ns,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994)). Chief Justice Veasey and
Justice Steele wrote separate dissents that would have affirmed on the basis that the NCS
board's decision was protected by the business judgment rule. Id. at 939 (Veasey, C.J.,
dissenting), 946 (Steele, J., dissenting).
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the appearance of a higher bidder before the
inevitable stockholder approval was secured.
Part of what Omnicare holds is that you cannot
completely lock up a deal during that window
between director approval and shareholder
approval.
The question really is whether you can address
that problem in a more practical way by
actually "dropping a consent"3 8  almost
immediately upon signing the merger
agreement that closes that window up and
reduces the possibility that an interloper could
appear and weed the regulatory approval as
sort of a condition to the closing of the
merger.39 There is not a great deal of law that
says one way or another whether you could
actually do that, but there is some comfort to
be gained from a transcript in Optima
International, Inc. v. WCI Steel International.40
Optima International was a Vice-Chancellor
Lamb opinion holding that a merger provision
that required delivery of majority written
The Omnicare decision has important ramifications with regard to deal protection
measures in acquisition agreements: First, the decision can be read to suggest a bright-
line rule that a "force the vote" provision cannot be utilized in connection with voting
agreements locking up over 50% of the stockholder vote unless the board of directors of
the target corporation retains for itself a fiduciary out that would enable it to terminate the
merger agreement in favor of a superior proposal. Second, the majority's decision
confirms that Unocal's enhanced judicial scrutiny is applicable to a Delaware court's
evaluation of deal protection measures designed to protect an acquisition agreement.
Where board-implemented defensive measures require judicial review under Unocal, the
initial burden is on the defendant directors to demonstrate that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness existed and that
they took action in response to the threat that was neither coercive nor preclusive and that
was within a range of reasonable responses to the threat perceived.
38. "Dropping a consent" refers to having the holders of a majority of the
outstanding voting shares execute a written consent approving the transaction.
39. See Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases, supra note 9, at 255-71.
40. In Optima International of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc., No. 3833-VCL (Del.
Ch. June 27, 2008), Vice Chancellor Lamb declined to enjoin a merger that had been
approved by the Board of WCI Steel Inc. (a closely held company with 28 stockholders)
and adopted by its stockholders later that same day by written consent pursuant to a
merger agreement permitting the acquirer to terminate the agreement if stockholder
approval was not obtained within 24 hours. See Optima Transcript, supra note 36, at
117-42.
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consent within 24 hours of execution of the
merger agreement was perfectly valid, even
though it was a Revlon case.4 1 Vice-Chancellor
Lamb explicitly stated that Delaware law does
not require that the fiduciary window has to
stay open for any significant period of time.
So if you grant the point that the continuing
duty to recommend a transaction operates only
in that window between director approval and
stockholder approval, you should feel better
about closing the window up quickly and
eliminating it by dropping a consent.42
41. Plaintiffs argued in Optima International that the board "abdicated its authority
or delegated its authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation to the
union and that they did so by declining to strenuously challenge the union on its
interpretation of the successorship provision." Id. at 124. The Court rejected that
argument and distinguished the provision in the union contract from an invalid "no-hand
poison pill," or the "force-the-vote provision" in Omnicare, noting that the successorship
provision was not self-imposed, but rather had been approved by the Bankruptcy Court as
a condition of WCI's emergence from bankruptcy. Id. at 124-25. In response to
Plaintiffs' argument that the stockholder vote was a form of a lockup that either exceeded
the board's power or resulted in a breach of its fiduciary duties in violation of Omnicare,
Vice Chancellor Lamb explained:
But a stockholder vote is not like the lockup in Omnicare. First, it's really not
my place to note this, but Omnicare is of questionable continued vitality.
Secondly, the stockholder vote here was part of an executed contract that the
board recommended after deciding it was better for stockholders to take
Severstal's lower-but-more-certain bid than Optima's higher-but-more-risky
bid. In this context, the board's discussion reflects an awareness that the
company had severe liquidity problems. Moreover, it was completely unclear
that Optima would be able to consummate any transaction. Therefore, the
stockholder vote, although quickly taken, was simply the next step in the
transaction as contemplated by the statute. Nothing in the DGCL requires any
particular period of time between a board's authorization of a merger
agreement and the necessary stockholder vote. And I do not see how the
board's agreement to proceed as it did could result in a finding of a breach of
duty.
Id. at 127-28.
42. Omnicare was further explained and limited by the Court of Chancery in In re
OPENLANE, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 30, 2011), wherein Vice Chancellor Noble refused to enjoin an all-cash merger
transaction negotiated by an actively engaged and independent board, despite the fact that
the merger agreement did not contain a fairness opinion or a fiduciary out, and the
transaction was effectively locked up by the execution of written consents by a majority
of the stockholders on the day following execution of the merger agreement. In the
context of a thinly-traded company in which 68.5% of the stock was held by a 16-person
group of management and directors, the board negotiated with three potential strategic
buyers, but did not undertake a broad auction or contact any possible financial buyers.











Well, if we close the window up though, what
about disclosure? Delaware has a fiduciary
duty of candor that requires a corporation
seeking approval of its shareholders to a
proposed sale of substantially all of its assets to
provide adequate information to all 30
shareholders to make an informed business
decision in voting on the transaction.4 3 I have
not heard anybody say that because Target is a
closely held corporation the fiduciary duty of
candor is not applicable. In fact, Don, I think
you have educated me in the past that
Delaware regards the fiduciary duties to be
equally applicable in a closely held
corporation, so I am going to presume that you
are going to say the same thing applies in this
case.
I am.
We would obviously have no reason to say less
or to do anything other than what Don advises
under Delaware law, even if we have to put
together a proxy statement of some kind.
If we are going to do an asset deal, I think we
should have the Delaware counsel tell us
whether a stockholder approval is required.
three potential buyers, the lack of a fairness opinion, the lack of a post-signing market
check, and the lack of any provision in the merger agreement permitting the directors to
terminate it if their fiduciary duties so required, Vice Chancellor Noble reiterated that
Delaware does not impose a mandatory checklist of merger features, but cautioned that
where "a board fails to employ any traditional value maximization tool, such as an
auction, a broad market check, or a go-shop provision, that board must possess an
impeccable knowledge of the company's business for the Court to determine that it acted
reasonably." Id. at *5. Omnicare was distinguished on the grounds that the votes were
not strictly "locked up" pursuant to a voting agreement, although "after the Board
approved the Merger Agreement, the holders of a majority of shares quickly provided
consents." Id. at *9.
43. See Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases, supra note 9, at 27-34.
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DON WOLFE:
(Delaware Counsel)
DGCL § 271 requires stockholder approval if
the corporation is purporting to sell all or
substantially all of its assets," but as Byron
points out, without the risk of appraisal rights
ensuing after the transaction. The central
question in determining whether you need
stockholder approval in that circumstance is:
What constitutes all or substantially all? The
case law traditionally had been a little uneven
on this point. The test since Gimbel v. Signal"
has been to look at both quantitative and
qualitative factors, but the decisional law had
ranged quite widely. Then in Katz v.
Bregman46 a stockholder vote was required
where the assets being transferred were in the
neighborhood of 50%, which is quite low and it
is probably the low-water mark or high-water
mark, depending on your point of view in the
case law.
In an effort to harmonize the case law, Vice-
Chancellor, now Chancellor Strine, declared in
Hollinger a few years ago that the words "all or
substantially all" ought to be given their
obvious meaning, which is to say essentially
everything, and if there remained a substantial
viable ongoing component of the corporation
after the sale, then no vote of stockholders
would be required under DGCL § 271.47
44. In most states, shareholder approval of an asset sale is required if the corporation
is selling all or substantially all of its assets. The Delaware courts have used both
"qualitative" and "quantitative" tests in interpreting the phrase "substantially all," as it is
used in DGCL § 271 which requires stockholder approval for a corporation to "sell, lease
or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets." See Thorpe v. CERBCO,
Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996) (holding the sale of a subsidiary with 68% of assets,
which was primary income generator, to be "substantially all"; seller would be left with
only one operating subsidiary, which was marginally profitable).
45. Gimbel v. Signal Co., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) (holding assets
representing 41% of net worth but only 15% of gross revenues not to be "substantially
all").
46. Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981) (51% of total assets,
generating approximately 45% of net sales, held to be "substantially all").
47. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004), appeal
refused, 871 A.2d 1128 (Del. 2004). In Hollinger, the sale of assets by a subsidiary with
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I should mention something about the
suggestion that the assets be dropped down into
a subsidiary and sold by the subsidiary. There
was a time when Delaware practitioners
believed that one could escape the DGCL
§ 271 requirement under the doctrine of
independent legal significance 48 by dropping
the assets down into a wholly-owned
subsidiary and then selling the assets out of the
subsidiary. The only vote that would be
required in that instance, perhaps, we all
approval of its parent corporation (its stockholder) but not the stockholders of the parent,
was alleged by the largest stockholder of the parent to contravene DGCL § 271. Id at
346-47. Without reaching a conclusion, the Chancery Court commented in dicta that
"[w]hen an asset sale by the wholly owned subsidiary is to be consummated by a contract
in which the parent entirely guarantees the performance of the selling subsidiary that is
disposing of all of its assets and in which the parent is liable for any breach of warranty
by the subsidiary, the direct act of the parent's board can, without any appreciable stretch,
be viewed as selling assets of the parent itself." Id at 347 (the Court recognized that the
precise language of DGCL § 271 only requires a vote on covered sales by a corporation
of "its" assets, but felt that analyzing dispositions by subsidiaries on the basis of whether
there was fraud or a showing that the subsidiary was a mere alter ego of the parent as
suggested in Leslie v. Telephonics Office Techs., Inc., 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1237 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1993) was too rigid). Examining the consolidated economics of the subsidiary
level sale, the Chancery Court held (1) that "substantially all" of the assets should be
literally read, commenting that "[a] fair and succinct equivalent to the term 'substantially
all' would be 'essentially everything,"' notwithstanding past decisions that have looked at
sales of assets around the 50% level, Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 377; (2) that the principal
inquiry was whether the assets sold were "quantitatively vital to the operations of' seller,
id. at 379-82 (the business sold represented 57.4% of parent's consolidated EBITDA,
49% of its revenues, 35.7% of the book value of its assets, and 57% of its asset values
based on bids for the two principal units of the parent); (3) that the parent had a
remaining substantial profitable business after the sale (the Chancery Court wrote: "if the
portion of the business not sold constitutes a substantial, viable, ongoing component of
the corporation, the sale is not subject to Section 271," id. at 385 (quoting R. FRANK
BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, I THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 10.2, at 10-7 (3d ed. Supp. 2004)); and (4) that the
"qualitative" test of Gimbel focuses on "factors such as the cash-flow generating value of
assets" rather than subjective factors such as whether ownership of the business would
enable its managers to have dinner with the Queen, id. at 383. See BALOTrI &
FINKELSTEIN, supra, § 10.2 (3d ed. Supp. 2009); Mark A. Morton & Michael K. Reilly,
Clarity or Confusion: The 2005 Amendment to Section 271 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 10 DEAL POINTS (ABA/Comm. on Negotiated Acquisitions, Chi., Ill.)
Fall 2005, at 2; see also Subcomm. on Recent Judicial Developments, ABA Negotiated
Acquisitions Comm., Annual Survey ofJudicial Developments Pertaining to Mergers and
Acquisitions, 60 Bus. LAW. 843, 855-58 (2005).
48. See Fiduciary Duty Cases, supra note 9, at 13 n.66, 295 n.972, 362 n.1210, 363
n.1213.
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hoped, was the vote of the parent's board as the
stockholder of the subsidiary. But in the wake
of dicta in the Hollinger opinion, DGCL § 271
was amended to preclude this, and it is now
clear that while no vote is required to drop the
assets down into a wholly-owned subsidiary, a
stockholder vote of the parents' stockholders is
required when those assets are sold out of the
wholly-owned subsidiary itself.4 9
Also, I should mention a recent decision by the
Delaware Supreme Court in the Liberty Media
case addressing the question whether under
indenture language that precluded a sale
(without trustee approval) of all or
substantially all of the borrower's assets in a
transaction or series of transactions, the Court
should aggregate a number of transactions that
took place over time to decide whether all or
substantially all of the assets of the borrower
had been sold.50 The Court essentially declined
49. Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 375. To address the uncertainties raised by dicta in then
Vice Chancellor Strine's opinion in Hollinger, DGCL § 271 was amended effective
August 1, 2005 to add a new subsection (c), which provides as follows:
(c) For purposes of this section only, the property and assets of the corporation
include the property and assets of any subsidiary of the corporation. As used in
this subsection, "subsidiary" means any entity wholly-owned and controlled,
directly or indirectly, by the corporation and includes, without limitation,
corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships,
limited liability companies, and/or statutory trusts. Notwithstanding subsection
(a) of this section, except to the extent the certificate of incorporation otherwise
provides, no resolution by stockholders or members shall be required for a sale,
lease or exchange of property and assets of the corporation to a subsidiary.
75 Del. Laws ch. 30, § 28 (2005) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(c)
(West 2012)). This amendment answered certain questions raised by Hollinger, but
raised or left unanswered other questions (e.g., (i) whether subsection (c) applies in the
case of a merger of a subsidiary with a third party even though literally read DGCL § 271
does not apply to mergers, (ii) what happens if the subsidiary is less than 100% owned,
and (iii) what additional is meant by the requirement that the subsidiary be wholly
"controlled" as well as "wholly owned"). See Morton & Reilly, supra note 47, at 2-13;
cf Weinstein Enter., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499 (Del. 2005) (discussing "control" in the
context of a DGCL § 220 action seeking inspection of certain documents in the
possession of a publicly held New York corporation of which the defendant Delaware
corporation defendant was a 45.16% stockholder).
50. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 29 A.3d 225, 243-44









to do that, principally because it was unable to
find that the transactions were in any way
related or part of an overriding plan to
basically liquidate the company, and instead
found that they were independently motivated
transactions which had the effect of reducing
assets individually but should be aggregated
for this purpose.
Liberty Media was applying New York law.
Would the result be the same for Delaware?
Yes, the results should be the same in
Delaware. There was a lot of evidence in
Liberty Media put on by the indenture trustee
that the asset-to-debt ratio had changed greatly
in a way that suggested that the company was
really in the end a shadow of what it had been
before. The Court appeared to be impressed by
the fact that no language addressing those sorts
of metrics was included in the indenture in the
first place. Had there been, I think that
evidence would have been much more
persuasive, but as it was, the only language
was the language-"in a series of
transactions." That was not enough without an
overriding purpose to the various acquisitions,
which in this case took place over a seven-year
period, to justify aggregating the transactions
for purposes of this indenture covenant.
In any event, the folks in Texas decided to
make life simple. We said you could leverage
up a business before selling the assets and
change its character, and that would not require
shareholder approval. So why not be real
simple and say that a transaction does not
involve a sale of substantially all of the assets
if the company continues in a business after the
they constitute a transfer of
indenture).
"substantially all" of a company's assets under a bond
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transaction is done. The Texas Business
Organizations Code ("TBOC") provides, in
essence, that shareholder approval is required
for an asset sale under Texas law only if it is
contemplated that the corporation will cease to
conduct any business following the sale of
assets.
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act
took a similar approach, but it drew the line at
75%,52 and said that if a corporation after a sale
51. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.455 (West 2012) requires shareholder approval
for a sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, and id. § 21.451(2) defines
"sale of all or substantially all of the assets" so that it does not encompass any asset sale
if afterward the corporation (i) continues to engage in one or more businesses or (ii)
applies a portion of the consideration received in the asset sale to the conduct of a
business in which the corporation engages after the sale. See Byron F. Egan & Curtis W.
Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation-Texas versus Delaware: Is it Now Time to
Rethink Traditional Notions?, 54 SMU L. REV. 249, 287-290 (2001).
Rudisill v. Arnold White & Durkee, P.C., 148 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004),
arose out of the combination of Arnold White & Durke, P.C. ("A WD") with another law,
firm, Howrey & Simon ("HS") pursuant to a combination agreement that provided all of
AWD's assets other than those specifically excluded (three vacation condominiums, two
insurance policies and several auto leases) were to be transferred to HS in exchange for a
partnership interest in HS, which subsequently changed its name to Howrey Simon
Arnold & White, LLP ("HSA W'). In addition, AWD shareholders were eligible
individually to become partners in HSAW by signing its partnership agreement, which
most of them did. For business reasons, the AWD/HS combination was submitted to a
vote of AWD's shareholders. Three AWD shareholders submitted written objections to
the combination, voted against it, declined to sign the HSAW partnership agreement, and
then filed an action seeking a declaration of their entitlement to dissenters' rights or
alternate relief. Id. at 588. The Court accepted AWD's position that these shareholders
were not entitled to dissenters' rights because the sale was in the "usual and regular
course of business" as AWD continued "to engage in one or more businesses" within the
meaning of TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.09B (a predecessor to TBOC § 21.451(2)),
writing that "AWD remained in the legal services business, at least indirectly, in that
(1) its shareholders and employees continued to practice law under the auspices of
HSAW, and (2) it held an ownership interest in HSAW, which unquestionably continues
directly in that business." Id. at 563. The Court further held that AWD's obtaining
shareholder approval when it was not required by statute did not create appraisal rights,
pointing out that appraisal rights are available under the statute only "if special
authorization of the shareholders is required." Id (emphasis in original); see also
Subcomm. on Recent Judicial Developments, supra note 47, at 855-60.
52. A 1999 revision to the Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") excludes
from the requirement of a shareholder vote any disposition of assets that would not "leave
the corporation without a significant continuing business activity." MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 12.02(a). The revision includes a safe harbor definition of significant continuing
business activity: at least 25 percent of the total assets and 25 percent of either income







of assets retains 25% of the total assets that it
had before the transaction, or either 25% of the
income before taxes or 25% of the revenues,
then it would not be a sale of substantially all
of the assets or require shareholder approval. It
seems that Chancellor Strine in Hollinger has
articulated a standard in Delaware that is
functionally similar to the standard in Texas or
under the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act.
If we go the asset route, we add another party
to the transaction-the people with whom our
company has contracts that have to be
assigned, including the lease that has been
mentioned. We will have to go to them, seek
their consent to the assignments of their
contracts, and effectively give them
opportunities to try to wring out a little more
than the current obligations entail, which could
be a very serious problem.
Let us talk about your merger approach then.
If we do a merger, we still have to deal with
the contracts that have restrictions on
assignments in them. In an asset transaction,
one of the logistical difficulties that the parties
face is getting the consent of the counterparties
to the contracts or intellectual property
licenses. If we do a merger, we say that a
merger by state law is not an assignment. Does
the DGCL say that a merger is not an
assignment?
Well, it doesn't say that.5 3 There is
53. DGCL § 259(a) provides as follows:
When any merger or consolidation shall have become effective under this
chapter, for all purposes of the laws of this State the separate existence of all
the constituent corporations, or of all such constituent corporations except the
one into which the other or others of such constituent corporations have been
merged, as the case may be, shall cease and the constituent corporations shall
become a new corporation, or be merged into 1 of such corporations, as the
case may be, possessing all the rights, privileges, powers and franchises as well
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DON WOLFE: considerable precedent under Delaware law to
(Delaware Counsel) the effect that a contractual non-assignment
clause is not triggered by a stock purchase
agreement unless it expressly so provides, but
the Court of Chancery recently declined to
dismiss a claim that a reverse triangular merger
(that is a merger that preserved the corporate
identity of the original party to the contract in
question) constituted an assignment in the
context of contractual language that precluded
assignment "by operation of law or
otherwise."54 The court in that case recognized
the existing precedent that stock acquisitions
did not result in assignment, but noted that
mergers (even reverse triangular mergers) were
not necessarily the same thing. Vice
Chancellor Parsons suggested that an
assignment was a particular kind of transaction
and that adding the phrase "by operation of
law" really did not add much. I believe that the
of a public as of a private nature, and being subject to all the restrictions,
disabilities and duties of each of such corporations so merged or consolidated;
and all and singular, the rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of
said corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due
to any of said constituent corporations on whatever account, as well for stock
subscriptions as all other things action or belonging to each of such
corporations shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such
merger or consolidation; and all property, rights, privileges, powers and
franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as effectually the
property of the surviving or resulting corporation as they were of the several
and respective constituent corporations, and the title to any real estate vested by
deed or otherwise, under the laws of this State, in any of such constituent
corporations, shall not revert or be in any way impaired by reason of this
chapter; but all rights of creditors and all liens upon any property of any of said
constituent corporations shall be preserved unimpaired, and all debts, liabilities
and duties of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to
said surviving or resulting corporation, and may be enforced against it to the
same extent as if said debts, liabilities and duties had been incurred or
contracted by it.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
54. Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, No. 5589-VCP,
2011 WL 1348438, at *11-13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2011) (Delaware Chancery Court
declined to dismiss a claim that a reverse triangular merger effected an assignment of
rights under a contract which required consent for assignments "by operation of law or
otherwise," but noted that it might reach the conclusion on summary judgment or after
trial and that whether a reverse triangular merger effects an assignment by operation of











result was largely because it was on a motion
to dismiss and he felt the words were sloppy
enough to suggest that there was some
ambiguity there, but he did indicate that on
summary judgment he might very well change
his mind once he had been assured that there
was no evidence in the negotiation history that
would suggest what the parties intended.
Was the court influenced by the fact that
subsequently the company basically fired all
the employees and liquidated the company?
Do you think that was a factor?
That clearly was a factor and it was recited in
the opinion. I do not know that it should have
been a factor necessarily in construing the
contract language, but it clearly was a fact that
moved the Vice Chancellor in this particular
instance.
Sounds like we are coming full circle to that
wonderful term sheet.
No, I think we are coming full circle to an asset
transaction because I think that what Don has
told us is that there is some uncertainty under
Delaware law as to whether, for Delaware law
purposes, a merger would be an assignment. In
Texas, our statute specifically provides that a
merger is not an assignment and we have case
law that says the statute means what it says and
that is the result.55 But that is not the complete
55. While DGCL § 259(d) provides that all of the rights of the constituent
corporations shall be vested in the surviving corporation without reference to whether the
merger constitutes an assignment, TBOC § 10.008 expressly provides that a merger is not
an assignment as follows:
(a) When a merger takes effect:
(1) the separate existence of each domestic entity that is a party to the
merger, other than a surviving or new domestic entity, ceases;
(2) all rights, title, and interests to all real estate and other property owned
by each organization that is a party to the merger is allocated to and
vested, subject to any existing liens or other encumbrances on the
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answer because this deal involves intellectual
property. .
Under federal law, and remember when the
feds get involved, they begin to say that their
law trumps state law, we have a series of cases,
such as Cincom Systems v. Novelis
56stm isa20
Corporation. Cincom Systems is a 2009
Sixth Circuit Case in which the Court held that
under federal law, intellectual property rights
are not assignable, even indirectly, as part of a
business combination unless the owner of the
intellectual property rights has agreed
otherwise. Thus, we need to look very
carefully at all of Target's license agreements
to consider whether or not under the terms of
these licenses and under federal law there
would be an approval required. Nonetheless,
that is something that is doable and we would
have to do that even in a merger. So, why not
go ahead and do an asset transaction?
LARRY TAFE: But you wouldn't have to do it with a sale of
(Counsel for Target) stock.
BYRON EGAN: So Michael, can we avoid these transfer
(Moderator) restrictions and get a good tax result?
MICHAEL SCHLER: An asset sale will be treated as an asset sale for
(Tax Counsel) tax purposes, but if the seller is an S-
corporation, you can do a stock sale and elect
to treat it as an asset sale for tax purposes and
property, in one or more of the surviving or new organizations as provided
in the plan of merger without;
(A) reversion or impairment;
(B) any further act or deed; or
(C) any transfer or assignment having occurred.
Tex. Bus. Org. Act Ann. § 10.008(a) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
56. Cincom Sys. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 435-36 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding
that internal forward merger between sibling entities constituted an impermissible
software license transfer, notwithstanding a state corporation statute that provided that a








get the tax results of an asset sale, but without a
physical transfer of assets. I think under the
anti-assignment provisions, since the
corporation is still there with the same assets, a
stock sale would not violate the anti-
assignment restrictions. By the way, a sale of
stock of an S-corporation also probably avoids
state sales taxes, because in form there is no
transfer of assets; it is just deemed a transfer of
58assets for federal income tax purposes.
Frances, please explain to us how this would
play out in Europe, depending on whether the
transaction is structured as a stock sale, a
merger, or an asset sale. In particular, first
assume that Target is a UK company and in the
alternative that Buyer is a UK company, with
Target remaining a Delaware corporation.
Would the analysis change at all if Target
dropped its assets to an LLC subsidiary and
sold the LLC to Buyer?
I should start off by saying that I am an English
lawyer and this panel talks about Europe.
Although we have a common union and some
countries have a common currency, but not the
UK, the law is quite different in each
jurisdiction. There are some common rules.
There are some common baselines. One of the
things you have to think about when you are
looking at an acquisition of a European
company is where it is incorporated and what
the laws of that particular country are. You
should not assume that they will be the same.
There is particularly a big difference between
common law jurisdictions, like the UK, and the
civil code based jurisdictions, like France,
Italy, and Spain.
57. See Asset Acquisitions, supra note 12, at 926-29.
58. Id.
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If Target were a UK company, we would be
looking at the same sorts of issues as you have
heard discussed earlier today regarding asset
sale versus share sale. If Buyer does do a share
sale, then Buyer gets the whole thing, warts
and all. Buyer gets all the liabilities and has
multiple sellers to deal with.
If we were doing an asset sale, Buyer would be
worrying about how it can get contracts across
and how it can deal with the transaction taxes.
From a seller's point of view, the stock sale in
the UK would be preferable; and if you only
want some of the assets, then you would
probably prefer to do an asset sale. Sometimes
people get so worried about some issues that
they will insist on an asset sale, even though
transaction costs for an asset sale can be quite
high because we have different levels of
transaction taxes depending on the type of
assets being transferred. A stock deal will
attract tax at 1/2%, whereas assets can attract
much higher rates-some going up to 5%. So
all things to be taken into account, the same
sorts of issues apply to assets or stock deals. It
is ultimately a matter of negotiation.
There are other structures available,
particularly in Europe where mergers are a
more common method of bringing two
companies together, but we do not really do
those in the UK for private company deals.
If Buyer was a UK company buying an
American company, the main issue that you
would be looking at is the corporate
governance issues around what Buyer has to do
in order to authorize this acquisition. That
would depend on whether Buyer is a listed
company or not. If it is a private company, like
the private equity Buyer in this case, only





the transaction. If Buyer were, in contrast, an
English listed company, then under our stock
exchange rules, if this was a significant
acquisition, then it would require a shareholder
approval before Buyer could make the
acquisition. That would have to be a condition
of the transaction.
Just going back to asset deals for a moment, we
were talking about cherry picking liabilities.
One particular issue that is common across
Europe relates to employees. If you buy a
business, you cannot generally leave the
employees behind. They would all
automatically transfer across with the business.
If you want to lay them off, the buyer and
seller can agree amongst themselves who pays
what costs, but for the employees themselves,
they automatically go to the new employer.
That is a pretty important distinction. In the
U.S., very often when you buy assets, you
cherry pick the employees that you want to
take and leave the rest behind.








Larry, are you going to want a confidentiality
agreement in this deal?
I would like to have a confidentiality
agreement, certainly if you are going to be
interested in doing any due diligence or seeing
any of our records.
Irrespective of whether a deal is an asset deal, a
stock purchase, or a merger, the first document
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that the parties are likely to execute is in fact
the confidentiality agreement. Contrary to
popular belief, these agreements are not
boilerplate documents and, not infrequently,
they have resulted in litigation. There are,
however, certain key provisions that have
relatively standard contours.
The definition of "confidential information" is
important. Seller will want a very broad
definition that includes any written, electronic,
or oral information that gets passed along,
along with Buyer's notes, analyses, or anything
else based on that information. Buyer is
probably going to be successful in getting some
standard exceptions for information that is
generally publicly known, information that was
available to Buyer before getting information
from Seller, information received from a third
party that was not subject to a confidentiality
obligation, and for information that was
otherwise independently developed by Buyer.
Another issue will be who is a permitted
recipient of the confidential information
provided. Buyer will want a broad definition
that includes Buyer's bankers, lawyers,
accountants, employees, and directors. Seller,
on the other hand, will try to limit the number
of recipients who can get that information and
will probably try to require those people to be
bound by the confidentiality agreement or at
least to be informed of the existence of the
agreement and an oral assurance that they'll
abide by it.
The buyer is typically permitted to disclose
confidential information pursuant to a
59. See Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, app. B; see also Richard E. Climan et
al., Negotiating Acquisitions ofPublic Companies in Transactions Structured as Friendly





subpoena or other legal process, but the seller
often seeks to require that the buyer make
some level of effort in obtaining confidentiality
treatment by the court or the regulatory agency.
One of the more hotly negotiated topics is non-
solicitation of employees. Seller is going to
want a very broad provision restricting Buyer's
solicitation of or employment of Seller's
employees, but Buyer is going to want to try to
limit it to the people that it has met during the
due diligence process. Frequently, the
compromise is that the buyer is restricted from
soliciting certain high level people across the
board and then certain people that may have
been met in due diligence.
Confidentiality agreements usually have a
limited term, on average probably two to three
years, but with respect to a company that has
very mission-critical information, you may see
a bifurcation where things like intellectual
property and other things of that sort may have
a longer term to them. The confidentiality
agreement usually provides that the provision
of information does not create a license by
virtue of giving away the information and that
agreement does not constitute an agreement to
go into the transaction.
Normally I would ask that Target sign an
exclusivity agreement providing that Target
will not negotiate with any other party for a
specified period,6 0 because Buyer does not
wish to spend money on due diligence and
trying to develop an agreement unless it knows
it has a deal. Buyer wants to be able to do its
due diligence and then sit down and negotiate a
transaction. Like in a public transaction, in a
60. For forms of exclusivity agreement, see Climan, supra note 59, app. C-D at 704-
710.
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private deal it is very typical for a buyer, at this
stage after the confidentiality agreement is
done or maybe even in the confidentiality
agreement, to have a very broad exclusivity
agreement with the seller to the effect that the
company and its shareholders will not entertain
any offers from any other parties, will not shop
the deal, and will not negotiate with anybody
else.
Now, in this particular circumstance, knowing
that Mr. Tafe is an obstructionist and would
want to know what the terms of the deal would
be before signing some exclusivity
arrangement, we have presented a form of
letter of intent.6 1 It is a very standard letter of
intent that says that it is intended to put forth
the essence of the deal before we start drafting
a definitive agreement, and it generally
provides that its provisions are not binding on
the parties, at least not the description of the
deal terms, but there are a few binding
provisions like who is going to pay the
expenses and that Seller is not going to
negotiate with third parties while we are trying
to develop a deal. A letter of intent will be
sufficient for the parties to make their Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act filings.62 Our proposed letter
of intent provides that neither Target nor its
shareholders will directly or indirectly solicit
or entertain offers from; negotiate with; or in
any manner encourage, discuss, accept, or
consider any proposal of any other person in
connection with a possible acquisition of
Target or any of its assets.
LARRY TAFE: I am not sure we are at a point in this deal
(Counsel for Target) where we are in a position to agree that we will
61. See Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, app. C.
62. See the definition of HSR Act and related Comment in id. at 46-48. See also the









deal exclusively with Buyer in this particular
case. However, on the assumption that we
could get to enough of those terms, I certainly
have no problem in principle in giving Buyer a
certain period of time to complete its due
diligence63 and have a definitive agreement
which is binding.
Six months is fair.
No, six months is too long. Target would agree
to pay a termination fee that is contingent upon
Target's breach of the exclusivity agreement,
but Target would want a breakup fee if Buyer
decides to walk away as the company will have
been off the market and has been in this state
of suspension with all the employees worried
about their future. If you just kick tires enough
and then say you do not want to do this deal,
the letter of intent will be nonbinding on both
of us, but if you walk and it is not us who
walks or our fault, Buyer should pay a breakup
fee.
I'd also like to know from Don what the
Delaware law would do with respect to
Target's board locking up the company for a
period of time with an exclusivity agreement
and also the issue of the letter of intent being
nonbinding.
Well, there's unfortunately not a great deal of
law on this issue. It seems to be the emerging
view on the part of at least Vice Chancellor
Laster and Chancellor Strine, however, that
provisions of a letter of intent that do not recite
that they are to be nonbinding warrant judicial
respect and should be enforced, and that
exclusivity, no shop, and the similar provisions
63. See Manual on Acquisition Review (Am. Bar Ass'n 1995).
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are important contractual rights that are
bargained over, as you have just seen, and they
are unlikely to be adequately protected by a
contractual breach of contract damages
remedy, which to me means you might even be
able to get an injunction to enforce them. 4
The further view seems to be that these
provisions do not have inherent fiduciary outs65
that will be read into them, nor are they invalid
because they do not expressly so provide.
That does not mean that leaving out a fiduciary
out provision is a good idea from the
standpoint of the seller's board, because it is
putting itself between a rock and a hard place
between the contract and the board's fiduciary
obligations.
64. In Global Asset Capital, LLC v. Rubicon US REIT Inc., No. 5071-VCL (Del.
Ch. Nov. 16, 2009), in the context of explaining why he granted a temporary restraining
order enjoining the target and its affiliates from disclosing any of the contents of a letter
of intent or soliciting or entertaining any third-party offers for the duration of the letter of
intent, Vice Chancellor Laster wrote:
[I]f parties want to enter into nonbinding letters of intent, that's fine. They can
readily do that by expressly saying that the letter of intent is nonbinding, that
by providing that, it will be subject in all respects to future documentation,
issues that, at least at this stage, I don't believe are here. I think this letter of
intent is binding.... [A] no-shop provision, exclusivity provision, in a letter of
intent is something that is important. . . . [A]n exclusivity provision or a no-
shop provision is a unique right that needs to be protected and is not something
that is readily remedied after the fact by money damages. . . . [C]ontracts, in
my view, do not have inherent fiduciary outs. People bargain for fiduciary outs
because, as our Supreme Court taught in Van Gorkom, if you do not get a
fiduciary out, you put yourself in a position where you are potentially exposed
to contract damages and contract remedies at the same time you may
potentially be exposed to other claims. Therefore, it is prudent to put in a
fiduciary out, because otherwise, you put yourself in an untenable position.
That doesn't mean that contracts are options where boards are concerned.
Quite the contrary. And the fact that equity will enjoin certain contractual
provisions that have been entered into in breach of fiduciary duty does not give
someone carte blanche to walk as a fiduciary. . .. I don't regard fiduciary outs
as inherent in every agreement.
Transcript of Argument and Ruling on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Motion to Expedite at 89-91, Global Asset Capital, No. 5071 -VCL.
65. See supra note 64; see also Fiduciary Duty Cases, supra note 9, at 255-67
(discussing the concept of fiduciary out).
66. See the Preliminary Note to form of Letter of Intent in Acquisition Agreement,











It is important to remember that a letter of
intent is just a piece of the process, and a
preliminary piece at that, so granting
exclusivity rights early on is not, per se, a
breach of fiduciary duty so long as you respect
your obligations under Revlon, Unocal, or
Ace to vet the process before submitting it to
stockholder approval. There is plenty of time
after the letter of intent expires to do that in
one way or another.
So you will not let us simply have a six-month
period to negotiate this deal and then after we
have negotiated this deal, drop the consent the
next day?
No. I think in that situation the court would
expect that the board would have preserved
fiduciary outs in the letter of intent, or not
signed it at all, so that they could comply with
their obligation to make sure that was the best
deal available.
Frances, what would be the practice in Europe
or the UK?
Well, again quite similar. We would have the
same sorts of discussions about whether you
want the letter of intent. Are you going to end
up doing two negotiations? If you are going to
negotiate the letter of intent and then you are
going to negotiate the real agreement, why not
just jump to the real agreement? We certainly
do frequently have letters of intent and we
frequently have exclusivity arrangements.
It is possible to make the letter of intent
nonbinding. In the UK, you would make that
clear in the agreement itself and you would
make it subject to contract. You would say,
67. ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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"This is not a contract. The contract is
coming."
In the rest of Europe, especially the more civil
law based jurisdictions, it is sometimes not so
clear and you need to be very careful that you
get advice as to how to write it into your
document for the particular jurisdiction to
make it nonbinding because certainly in
France, Italy, Germany, and Holland they may
look at pre-contracts as being potentially
enforceable.
Regarding exclusivity arrangements, again in
the UK, we have quite a clear position. We
have a judgment from the House of Lords (now
the Supreme Court) saying that lockouts are
enforceable, so you can agree, as Byron is
asking, that you will not talk to somebody else
and you will not entertain negotiations with
another party for a limited period of time, and
that will depend on the circumstances of the
case as to what is reasonable. I tend to think
six months would be too long.
BYRON EGAN: What would be a proper period?
(Moderator)
FRANCES MURPHY: Maybe two months, but it depends on the
(European Counsel) circumstances and how difficult you think it is
going to be to do the due diligence on the
business.
A lockout agreement in the UK is fine. A lock-
in agreement-you will negotiate with me over
the next few months-is not enforceable in the
UK. The court would say you cannot force
someone to talk. The contrasting point, I think,
is that in Europe you need to be aware of
implied obligations to negotiate in good faith,
because in some jurisdictions there is an
implied obligation, once you sign a letter of
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intent and agree that you are going to have
discussions about a deal, that you will actually
have those discussions. That can be an
enforceable obligation. Breach of an implied
duty of good faith may give rise to damages
and costs and possibly extend to damages for
loss of bargain. Beware of what you are
getting into when you start doing deals in
continental Europe.
The final point I was going to make is that in
some jurisdictions, if you sign a letter of intent,
that may start to trigger filing obligations.
Thus, you need local advice before you put pen
to paper.
IV. SELECTED ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT PROVISIONS
RICHARD DE ROSE:
(Investment Banker)
Byron has agreed not to pursue a letter of intent
and instead has sent Larry last night the
Proposed Agreement, which is Byron's
standard form of asset acquisition agreement
and is based on a draft of the ABA Model
Asset Purchase Agreement. Byron suggests he
and Larry get together to go over his form of
Proposed Agreement and see if there are any
issues.
A. Sufficiency of Assets
LARRY TAFE:
(Counsel for Target)
There are some issues that I would just like to
put on the table at the outset. Your
representation in Section 3.6 of the Proposed
Agreement, which provides simply that the
assets being sold are sufficient to run the
business, 69 is not appropriate for this proposed
68. See Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 28-298.
69. Section 3.6 of the Buyer's Proposed Agreement provides:
3.6 Sufficiency of Assets
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BYRON EGAN:
(Counsel for Buyer)
transaction. I understand that such provisions
are sometimes appropriate in a transaction
where a seller would be selling a division and
you have everything carved out of the seller to
enable a buyer to operate with the purchased
assets, or if you are purchasing a subsidiary
that is reliant upon services being provided by
the parent, that a buyer would want assurance
that it is getting all that you need to run the
business free from other parts of the enterprise.
Here, however, we are selling you the entire
business and all you have to do is look at it to
see whether Target has sufficient assets.
Target has financial statements, equipment, and
an inventory of widgets. Why do we need
Section 3.6?
Well, if it is as easy as you are saying, and this
provision is just words on a piece of paper,
then Seller should not have any problem with
the representation in Section 3.6 of the
Proposed Agreement. On the other hand, there
are frequently situations where all of the assets
to run this business are not really on the
balance sheet of the business or owned by the
business, but rather, for example, the founder
of the company could have some intellectual
property, maybe patent rights used in the
company that we are buying. Perhaps there is
a blocking patent that lurks somewhere in the
background that the founder of the company
has never gotten around to assigning to the
company.
To guard against a situation surfacing where
Buyer buys the assets of this business and
begins to run it, and then the founder comes
Except as disclosed in Part 3.6, the Assets (a) constitute all of the assets,
tangible and intangible, of any nature whatsoever, necessary to operate Seller's
business in the manner presently operated by Seller and (b) include all of the
operating assets of Seller.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 107.
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forth and says that your operations are going to
infringe my personal patent that I did not
assign to the company, and, therefore, ante up
or stop using that intellectual property to
manufacture your products.
So, in order to give Buyer a claim for breach of
the agreement in the event that happens, we
would have a provision like Section 3.6 which
says except as you have told us, the assets that
we are buying constitute all of the assets,
tangible and intangible, necessary to run the
business that we are purchasing. Simple as
that.
B. Taxes
LARRY TAFE: I want to talk about the tax representation in
(Counsel for Target) Section 3.14 of the Proposed Agreement. 70
70. Section 3.14 of the Buyer's Proposed Agreement provides as follows:
3.14 TAXES
(a) Tax Returns Filed and Taxes Paid. Seller has filed or caused to be filed on
a timely basis all Tax Returns and all reports with respect to Taxes that are or
were required to be filed pursuant to applicable Legal Requirements. All Tax
Returns and reports filed by Seller are true, correct and complete in all material
respects. Seller has paid, or made provision for the payment of, all Taxes that
have or may have become due for all periods covered by the Tax Returns or
otherwise, or pursuant to any assessment received by Seller, except such Taxes,
if any, as are listed in Part 3.14(a) and are being contested in good faith and as
to which adequate reserves (determined in accordance with GAAP) have been
provided in the Balance Sheet and the Interim Balance Sheet. Except as
provided in Part 3.14(a), Seller currently is not the beneficiary of any extension
of time within which to file any Tax Return. No claim has been made within
the preceding five years by any Governmental Body in a jurisdiction where
Seller does not file Tax Returns that it is or may be subject to taxation by that
jurisdiction. There are no Encumbrances on any of the Assets that arose in
connection with any failure (or alleged failure) to pay any Tax.
(b) Delivery of Tax Returns and Information Regarding Audits and Potential
Audits. Seller has delivered or made available to Buyer copies of all Tax
Returns filed since _ _, 20_. The federal income Tax Returns of Seller
have been audited by the IRS or are closed by the applicable statute of
limitations for all taxable years through _ , 20_. Part 3.14(b) contains a
complete and accurate list of all Tax Returns that are currently under audit or
for which Seller has received written notice of a pending audit, and Seller has
provided to Buyer information concerning any deficiencies or other amounts
that are currently being contested. All deficiencies proposed as a result of such
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audits have been paid, reserved against, settled, or are being contested in good
faith by appropriate proceedings as described in Part 3.14(b). Seller has
delivered, or made available to Buyer, copies of any examination reports,
statements or deficiencies, or similar items with respect to such audits. There is
no dispute or claim concerning any Taxes of Seller claimed or raised by any
Governmental Body in writing. Part 3.14(b) contains a list of all Tax Returns
for which the applicable statute of limitations has not run. Except as described
in Part 3.14(b), Seller has not given or been requested to give waivers or
extensions (or is or would be subject to a waiver or extension given by any
other Person) of any statute of limitations relating to the payment of Taxes of
Seller or for which Seller may be liable.
(c) Proper Accrual. The charges, accruals, and reserves with respect to Taxes
on the Records of Seller are adequate (determined in accordance with GAAP)
and are at least equal to Seller's liability for Taxes. There exists no proposed
tax assessment or deficiency against Seller except as disclosed in the [Interim]
Balance Sheet or in Part 3.14(c).
(d) Specific Potential Tax Liabilities and Tax Situations.
(i) Withholding. All Taxes that Seller is or was required by Legal
Requirements to withhold, deduct or collect have been duly withheld,
deducted and collected and, to the extent required, have been paid to the
proper Governmental Body or other Person.
(ii) Tax Sharing or Similar Agreements. There is no tax sharing
agreement, tax allocation agreement, tax indemnity obligation or similar
written or unwritten agreement, arrangement, understanding or practice
with respect to Taxes (including any advance pricing agreement, closing
agreement or other arrangement relating to Taxes) that will require any
payment by Seller.
(iii) Consolidated Group. Seller (A) has not been a member of an
affiliated group within the meaning of Code Section 1504(a) (or any
similar group defined under a similar provision of state, local or foreign
law), and (B) has no liability for Taxes of any person (other than Seller
and its Subsidiaries) under Reg. §1.1502 6 (or any similar provision of
state, local or foreign law), as a transferee or successor by contract or
otherwise.
(iv) S Corporation. Seller is not an S corporation as defined in Code
Section 1361.
ALTERNATIVE No. 1:
Seller is an S corporation as defined in Code Section 1361 and Seller
is not and has not been subject to either the built in gains tax under
Code Section 1374 or the passive income tax under Code Section
1375.
ALTERNATIVE No. 2:
Seller is an S corporation as defined in Code Section 1361 and Seller
is not subject to the tax on passive income under Code Section 1375,
but is subject to the built in gains tax under Code Section 1374, and
all tax liabilities under Code Section 1374 though and including the
Closing Date have been or shall be properly paid and discharged by
Seller.
INCLUDE WITH BOTH ALTERNATIVE No. 1 AND No. 2:
Part 3.14(d)(iv) lists all the states and localities with respect to which
Seller is required to file any corporate, income or franchise tax
returns and sets forth whether Seller is treated as the equivalent of an
S corporation by or with respect to each such state or locality. Seller





Target does not have a problem with
representing that there will be no tax liabilities
or tax liens or the like that will carry over to
Buyer and for which Buyer would be
responsible. I do not think 14 paragraphs of
tax reps are necessary for an asset deal,
although they may be appropriate in a stock
deal or a merger. If it becomes an asset deal,
you start on day one from scratch, and Target's
historical tax returns ought to be about as
interesting to you as grass growing.
I am sympathetic with Larry as Section 3.14 is
lengthy and would be much more appropriate
for a stock deal than an asset sale. That is not
to say that a buyer of assets does not normally
expect the seller to give a certain number of
reps, because the buyer of assets can be
assuming unpaid property and similar taxes. In
addition, the buyer might have to pay state
sales taxes because nobody ever complies with
the Bulk Sales Laws, and so in theory the
buyer can be subject to state sales taxes if there
are liens on the assets.
Also, a buyer will often want to know
generally what the tax status is of the business,
because even though it is not liable for the
taxes of the seller and is starting over with new
taxes and new tax returns, it is the same
business and so they have to file tax returns in
the same places. Very often there is the
question, depending on how the business is
operating in different states, what state tax
returns it has to file. So it is good to know
liabilities for taxes in any states or localities in which it is subject to
Tax.
(v) Substantial Understatement Penalty. Seller has disclosed on its
federal income Tax Returns all positions taken therein that could give rise
to a substantial understatement of federal income Tax within the meaning
of Code Section 6662.
Id. at 110-12.
71. See id. at 170-73.
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some things like where is the seller filing, and
has any tax authority in a different state ever
claimed that taxes were due. Even though the
buyer is not responsible for the past, the buyer
may have the same issue with the tax authority.
So to some extent, the buyer has an interest in
what has been going on with the business tax
wise, but it is still true that in a stock sale you
care a lot more than in an asset sale.
Personally, I think this whole issue about the
scope of the tax representations is really a
sideshow. The real issue in an agreement like
this is what is the scope of the indemnity for
pre-closing taxes. Whether it is a stock deal or
an asset deal, Buyer will want Seller to give an
absolute first dollar indemnity for every dollar
of pre-closing taxes that might arise, and Seller
will say no. Then you will fight over that and
what the scope of indemnity is.
But if Buyer gets its indemnity, it does not
really care about the reps anymore because the
indemnity covers all of the taxes that might
arise. You might care about the reps a little bit
because it could affect post-closing taxes if
there is a breach of rep, but the vast majority of
what Buyer cares about would be picked up if
they get an indemnity for all pre-closing taxes.
You can fight all day about the scope of the
reps, but the real issue is the scope of the
indemnity.
BYRON EGAN: But the indemnity is post-closing and the
(Counsel for Buyer) correctness of the representations is a condition
to Buyer's obligation to close. Then we have
the issue of rescission, and if you have a
misrepresentation then we may find that you
have misled us and we have a ground for a
rescission. 72 Having a representation, as well
72. See id. at 267-69.
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as in the indemnity, is an advantage to Buyer.
MICHAEL SCHLER: Now, that is a good point. If Buyer discovers
(Tax Counsel) the representations are just lies, then if it is
significant enough, Buyer does not have to
close. However, that is a fairly extreme case
and most sellers will be careful and not have
their representations be so inaccurate. There is
a reason for a seller to be careful about what
representations it is giving, but assuming it is
not lying, the seller really is not giving the
buyer any right not to close and the real issue is
the indemnity.
BYRON EGAN: But there is also the issue of information. Part
(Counsel for Buyer) of the function of any representation is to
gather information, and what kind of taxes this
business has been paying is fairly important for
Buyer's understanding what kind of business
and what kind of tax risks it may have going
forward. So, while the esteemed tax counsel
was pointing out things from a tax perspective,
a very conservative buyer that does not want to
lose money on this deal is going to ask for as
much protection as can be negotiated.





There is another representation that I like less
than even those other two. Section 3.3373 of
73. Section 3.33 of the Buyer's Proposed Agreement provides as follows:
3.33 Disclosure
(a) No representation or warranty or other statement made by Seller or either
Shareholder in this Agreement, the Disclosure Letter, any supplement to the
Disclosure Letter, the certificates delivered pursuant to Section 2.7(b) or
otherwise in connection with the Contemplated Transactions contains any
untrue statement or omits to state a material fact necessary to make any of
them, in light of the circumstances in which it was made, not misleading.
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the Proposed Agreement is just called
"Disclosure," which is benign, but it is
basically a Rule lOb-5 74 representation on
steroids. Section 3.33 essentially says that no
representation or warranty or other statement
made by seller or any shareholder made in this
agreement or any supplemental delivered
pursuant to the Proposed Agreement or
otherwise in connection with the contemplated
transactions contains any untrue statement or
omits to state a material fact necessary to make
them any of them in light of the circumstances.
I really object to that one. I think it is a
"gotcha" rep. As I mentioned before, you have
32 reps before that. This is Section 3.33, and
Sections 3.1 to 3.32 already cover more ground
than you could ever need. You drafted them.
It just is not appropriate to get to the end of all
that and say "oh by the way, if I forgot to ask
for something or if by any chance there's an
omission that would make something
misleading, then I get to back out of the deal or
seek indemnity." Section 3.33 is a formula that
was devised, and has survived the test of time,
for people selling securities in the public
market with documents that they prepare
unilaterally that do not get any negotiation, and
that do not have any due diligence, or have any
opportunity to ask questions. Section 3.33 is
inappropriate here.
If there is a misrepresentation in the Proposed
Agreement, you do not need Section 3.33 to
tell you that sellers promise that they have not
(b) Seller does not have Knowledge of any fact that has specific application to
Seller (other than general economic or industry conditions) and that may
materially adversely affect the assets, business, prospects, financial condition,
or results of operations of Seller that has not been set forth in this Agreement or
the Disclosure Letter.
Id. at 151.





said something phony elsewhere in the
Proposed Agreement. To the extent that
Section 3.33 begins to bring in notions of
omissions, we suddenly have an obligation to
make sure that you have asked for what you
need.
That is the "trust me" defense, and representing
Buyer, I would not buy into that. Now Larry
has got a fair point here, and I am going to step
out of my normal aggressive Buyer's counsel
role on this issue. Section 3.33 says that no
representation, etc. is incorrect, but then it says,
"in this agreement or otherwise." What those
little words "or otherwise" do is pick up all that
Richard De Rose, as investment banker, has
communicated during the course of trying to
get the Buyer enticed into the transaction-
some of those emails may have been a bit more
flowery than in retrospect would be
desirable-and whatever else may have been
picked up in Buyer's due diligence.
Further, this is an asset transaction and SEC
Rule lOb-5 is not applicable because we do not
have a security. If the assets being sold did
include securities then perhaps this asset
purchase would be in connection with the sale
of a security.
Then Rule 1Ob-5 also includes the
requirements of reliance and scienter. Section
3.33 of the Proposed Agreement simply says
no statement that was made anywhere in the
course of this transaction is incorrect. That is a
very significant representation contractually. If
I am representing Seller, I will want to
contractually limit Sellers' exposure for extra
contractual representations. I am going to ask
Buyer to disclaim having relied on the stuff in
the data room or otherwise not in the four
corners of the Proposed Agreement.
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Now, if I am representing Buyer, I am going to
object and say Seller is defrauding Buyer if the
projections Seller gave Buyer are wrong.
Buyer relied on what you were telling it in the
data room. We want you to be telling us the
truth because we are relying on you and expect
to hold you accountable if anything proves to
be incorrect.
Larry is going to ask for a provision that says
"[a]ll representations and warranties set forth
in this Agreement are contractual in nature
only and subject to the sole and exclusive
remedies set forth [in this agreement]."75  So
the only remedy that is going to be available to
Buyer is going to be the indemnification
provisions in the Proposed Agreement. Those
provisions are going to have caps and baskets
and procedures for certain claims and times for
asserting claims. So, sellers are going to
attempt to circumscribe the horizon and limit a
claim for fraudulent inducement. In order to
negate a possible claim for fraudulent
inducement, the seller is going to ask the buyer
to say in expansive language that "except for
the representations and warranties expressly
made in this agreement that there is no other
representation and warranty that has been
made, express or implied, in law or otherwise."
The essence of Seller's position is the Proposed
Agreement contains all of the promises that
have been made by Seller about this company,
and if it is not in the four corners of the
Proposed Agreement, then it has not been
relied on.
75. Glenn D. West & Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual
Liability-Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the "Entire" Deal?, 64 Bus. LAW.
999, 1037 (2009); see Byron F. Egan et al., Contractual Limitations on Seller Liability in
M&A Agreements, in University of Texas School of Law 7th Annual Mergers and




Then you move to Section 13.7 of the Proposed
Agreement, 76 the essence of which is that "this
agreement supersedes all prior agreements,
whether written or oral, between the parties
with respect to the subject matter including any
letter of intent, any confidentiality agreement,
etc." This is intended to mean that the
Proposed Agreement is the entire agreement of
the parties and contains all of the provisions to
which the parties have agreed.7
There have been a number of recent cases,
particularly in Texas, dealing with the
enforceability of non-reliance and entire
agreement provisions. The Italian Cowboy
case7 8 was a Texas Supreme Court holding that
a merger clause like Section 13.7 will not
negate a fraud in the inducement claim unless
it is expressly inclusive of words disclaiming
76. Section 13.7 of the Buyer's Proposed Agreement provides:
13.7 Entire Agreement and Modification
This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements, whether written or oral,
between the parties with respect to its subject matter (including any letter of
intent and any confidentiality agreement between Buyer and Seller) and
constitutes (along with the Disclosure Letter, Exhibits and other documents
delivered pursuant to this Agreement) a complete and exclusive statement of
the terms of the agreement between the parties with respect to its subject
matter. This Agreement may not be amended, supplemented or otherwise
modified except by a written agreement executed by the party to be charged
with the amendment.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 266.
77. See Dujardin v. Liberty Media Corp., 359 F. Supp.2d 337, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
("It is generally understood that the purpose of an integration clause 'is to require full
application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the writing."') (quoting Primex Int'l Corp. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 89 N.Y.2d 594, 599 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997). If the parties want any pre-
existing agreements between the parties regarding the acquisition (such as the
confidentiality agreement or certain provisions in the letter of intent) to remain in effect,
this Section 13.7 would have to be revised accordingly. If the seller wants to
contractually negate that the seller had made any representations beyond those expressly
set forth in Article 3, the seller should consider a more expansive entire agreement and
non-reliance provision such as the alternate Section 13.7 Entire Agreement, Non-reliance,
Exclusive Remedies and Modification provisions set forth infra, text following note 80.
78. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex.
2011) (limiting effect of merger clause without additional disclaimer of reliance on
representations).
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reliance on representations made prior to the
signing of the contract. That was followed by
the Allen case,79 which said that such a
provision must be specifically bargained for
and cannot be boilerplate. Then the last case in
the trilogy, Staton Holdings,0 said that the
express negligence doctrine,8 1 which we have
in Texas and which actually exists in a slightly
different form in Delaware, applies to non-
reliance provisions and requires that the
communication of extraordinary shifting of
risks needs to be in express, clear, conspicuous
language (in Texas, we advise our clients that
conspicuous means it should be in boldface
type). As a result of these three Texas cases,
an entire agreement/non-reliance provision that
a seller might seek could read as follows:
13.7 Entire Agreement, Non-reliance,
Exclusive Remedies and Modification
(a) This Agreement supersedes all prior
agreements, whether written or oral,
between the parties with respect to its
subject matter (including any letter of
intent and any confidentiality agreement
between Buyer and Seller) and
constitutes (along with the Disclosure
Letter, Exhibits and other documents
delivered pursuant to this Agreement) a
complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement between the
79. Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., _ S.W.3d _ , 2011 WL 3208234
(Tex. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that a release without an express disclaimer of reliance
was ineffective to limit fraudulent inducement claim; must show use of negotiation rather
than boilerplate provisions).
80. Staton Holdings, Inc. v. Tatum, L.L.C., 345 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 2011)
(discussing express negligence and inclusion of conspicuous, bold face type provisions).
81. See id. at 733-35 (outlining Texas's express negligence jurisprudence); see also
Fina, Inc. v. ARCO, 200 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Delaware law and holding
that the indemnification provision did not satisfy the Delaware requirement that
indemnification provisions be clear and unequivocal). For additional discussion, see
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 238-40 (suggesting and discussing an asset




parties with respect to its subject matter.
This Agreement may not be amended,
supplemented or otherwise modified
except by a written agreement executed
by the party to be charged with the
amendment.
(b) Except for the representations and
warranties contained in Article 3, none
of Seller or any Shareholder has made
any representation or warranty,
expressed or implied, as to Seller or as to
the accuracy or completeness of any
information regarding Seller furnished or
made available to Buyer and its
representatives, and none of Seller or any
Shareholder shall have or be subject to
any liability to Buyer or any other Person
resulting from the furnishing to Buyer, or
Buyer's use of or reliance on, any such
information or any information,
documents or material made available to
Buyer in any form in expectation of, or
in connection with, the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement.
(c) Following the Closing, the sole and
exclusive remedy for any and all claims
arising under, out of, or related to this
Agreement, or the sale and purchase of
the Seller, shall be the rights of
indemnification set forth in Article 11
only, and no person will have any other
entitlement, remedy or recourse, whether
in contract, tort or otherwise, it being
agreed that all of such other remedies,
entitlements and recourse are expressly
waived and released by the parties hereto
to the fullest extent permitted by law.
[Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
parties have agreed that if the Buyer can
demonstrate, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a material representation
and warranty made by the Seller or the
Selling Shareholder in this Agreement
was deliberately made and known to be
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materially untrue by any of the Seller
Knowledge Parties, then the Deductible
shall not apply and the Cap shall be
increased to the Purchase Price with
respect to any resulting indemnification
claim under Section 11.2.]
(d) The provisions of this Section 13.7,
together with the provisions of Sections
3.33 and 3.34, and the limited remedies
provided in Article 11, were specifically
bargained for between Buyer and Sellers
and were taken into account by Buyer
and the Sellers in arriving at the
Purchase Price. The Sellers have
specifically relied upon the provisions of
this Section 13.7, together with the
provisions of Sections 3.33 and 3.34, and
the limited remedies provided in Article
11, in agreeing to the Purchase Price and
in agreeing to provide the specific
representations and warranties set forth
herein.
(e) All claims or causes of action
(whether in contract or in tort, in law or
in equity) that may be based upon, arise
out of or relate to this Agreement, or the
negotiation, execution or performance of
this Agreement (including any
representation or warranty made in or in
connection with this Agreement or as an
inducement to enter into this
Agreement), may be made only against
the entities that are expressly identified
as parties hereto. No Person who is not a
named party to this Agreement,
including without limitation any director,
officer, employee, incorporator, member,
partner, stockholder, Affiliate, agent,
attorney or representative of any named
party to this Agreement ("Non-Party
Affiliates"), shall have any liability
(whether in contract or in tort, in law or
in equity, or based upon any theory that







party against its owners or affiliates) for
any obligations or liabilities arising
under, in connection with or related to
this Agreement or for any claim based
on, in respect of, or by reason of this
Agreement or its negotiation or
execution; and each party hereto waives
and releases all such liabilities, claims
and obligations against any such Non-
Party Affiliates. Non-Party Affiliates are
expressly intended as third party
beneficiaries of this provision of this
Agreement.
(f) This Agreement may not be
amended, supplemented or otherwise
modified except by a written agreement
executed by the arty to be charged with
the amendment.
While the foregoing provision is lengthy and is
intended to address the concerns expressed by
the courts in the Italian Cowboy, Allen, and
Staton Holdings cases, circumstances and
future cases will no doubt suggest revision of
the foregoing in particular cases.
Do those Texas cases involve sophisticated
purchases represented by counsel?
Yes. The sophistication of the parties and their
representation by counsel is key to the
enforceability of a provision like the above
Section 13.7. Protecting unsophisticated
investors is certainly something courts will do.
In the Allen case, the seller was a partner in a
major Houston law firm and the other party to
the transaction was a former partner of a major
82. This alternative Section 13.7 is derived from the Model Provisions suggested in
West, supra note 75, at 1038, as well as the Italian Cowboy, Allen, and Staton Holdings
cases discussed above. See also Byron F. Egan et al., Contractual Limitations on Seller
Liability in M&A Transactions, in ABA Section of Business Law Spring Meeting
Program on "Creating Contractual Limitations on Seller Liability that Work Post-
Closing: Avoiding Serious Pitfalls in Domestic and International Deals," Denver, Colo.
(April 22, 2010), available at http://images.jw.com/com/publications/1362.pdf.
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Dallas law firm. These people knew what they
were doing, and they were also crafty. When
one side wanted to change the deal that had
been agreed to, it found that the release
language left out some of the magic words. It
is kind of like the difference between the right
word and the almost right word can be the
difference between lightning bolt and lightning
bug. A non-reliance provision needs to be
inclusive and tailored to the particular
transaction. It must expressly disclaim reliance
on any representations that are not embodied in
the four corners of the agreement, and perhaps
even in the particular enumerated sections
thereof. It should say that no reliance has been
placed on any statements made by any
representatives of any of the parties in any data
room or by any affiliate of any party. It should
state that fraud in the inducement claims are
being released.
DON WOLFE: The leading Delaware case on this topic is a
(Delaware Counsel) case called ABRY Partners v. F& W
Acquisition,8 another then Vice Chancellor
83. ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch.
2006). In ABRY, a stock purchase agreement included a merger clause, or a "buyer's
promise," that it was not relying upon any representations and warranties not stated in the
contract. The Delaware Chancery Court wrote that such provisions are generally
enforceable:
When addressing contracts that were the product of give-and-take between
commercial parties who had the ability to walk away freely, this court's
jurisprudence has ... honored clauses in which contracted parties have
disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual representations, which prohibits the
promising party from reneging on its promise by premising a fraudulent
inducement claim on statements of fact it had previously said were neither
made to it nor had an effect on it.
The teaching of this court . . . is that a party cannot promise, in a clear
integration clause of a negotiated agreement, that it will not rely on promises
and representations outside of the agreement and then shirk its own bargain in
favor of a "but we did rely on those other representations" fraudulent
inducement claim. The policy basis for this line of cases is, in my view, quite
strong. If there is a public policy interest in truthfulness, then that interest
applies with more force, not less, to contractual representations of fact.
Contractually binding, written representations of fact ought to be the most
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Strine decision from 2006. In that case the
court held that reliance clauses of this sort are
typically enforceable. It would be, in the view
of our court, inequitable and contrary to public
policy for a sophisticated commercial party to
state affirmatively in the contract that it was
relying only on the contractual representations
and warranties, and then attempt to avoid the
effect of that statement by claiming that in fact
that wasn't true and that it has been fooled by
the express contractual promise that was made.
It is worth remembering that public policy for
years precluded these kinds of provisions on
the assumption that the law abhors fraudulent
conduct. ABR Y represents a derogation of the
common law, and there are some exceptions
that continue to exist. One exception to ABRY
is along the lines that Byron has already
described: if the provision is less than clear,
less than explicit or murky or otherwise
ambiguous on the point, the parties remain
responsible for any fraudulent representations
made outside the agreement, notwithstanding
the inclusion of this sloppy language.
reliable of representations, and a law intolerant of fraud should abhor parties
that make such representations knowing they are false.
Nonetheless, ... we have not given effect to so-called merger or integration
clauses that do not clearly state that the parties disclaim reliance upon extra-
contractual statements. Instead, we have held ... that murky integration
clauses, or standard integration clauses without explicit anti-reliance
representations, will not relieve a party of its oral and extra-contractual
fraudulent representations. The integration clause must contain "language
that . . . can be said to add up to a clear anti-reliance clause by which the
plaintiff has contractually promised that it did not rely upon statements outside
the contract's four corners in deciding to sign the contract." This approach
achieves a sensible balance between fairness and equity-parties can protect
themselves against unfounded fraud claims through explicit anti-reliance
language. If parties fail to include unambiguous anti-reliance language, they
will not be able to escape responsibility for their own fraudulent representations
made outside of the agreement's four corners.
Id. 1056-59 (citations omitted). In ABRY, however, the court allowed a fraud claim to
proceed where, notwithstanding a clear anti-reliance provision, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had intentionally lied within the four corners of the agreement. See West,
supra note 75, at 1023-24.
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The second exception, which is perhaps a bit
murky itself, is that such provisions will not
exculpate intentional fraud or lying with
respect to provisions that are stated in the
contract itself. So we are not talking about
extra contractual promises here, but
misrepresentations relating to affirmative
statements, either covenants or representations,
in the agreement itself. This latter exception is
illuminated by the recent decision by
Chancellor Chandler in OverDrive v. Baker &
Taylor,84 which involved a joint venture
agreement that explicitly recited that it was to
be an exclusive distribution arrangement
84. ABRY was explained and limited in OverDrive, Inc. v. Baker & Taylor, Inc.,
2011 WL 2448209 (Del.Ch. June 17, 2011), which arose out of a failed joint venture in
which defendant allegedly breached its promises to exclusively distribute plaintiffs
audiobooks and other digital media to defendant's books and physical media customers.
The joint venture agreement provided that "[n]either party is relying on any
representations, except those set forth herein, as inducement to execute this Agreement."
Id. at *6. Plaintiff alleged that defendant intentionally lied about specific provisions in
the agreement in failing to reveal plans to use digital media information received from
plaintiff in digital media arrangements with competitors. Id. at *7. In denying
defendant's motion to dismiss, Chancellor Chandler wrote:
Under the teaching of ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, use of
an anti-reliance clause in such a manner is contrary to public policy if it would
operate as a shield to exculpate defendant from liability for its own intentional
fraud-"there is little support for the notion that it is efficient to exculpate
parties when they lie about the material facts on which a contract is premised."
Defendant responds that the public policy exception in ABRY is limited to
situations where a defendant "intentionally misrepresents a fact embodied in a
contract," and that the only alleged misrepresentations at issue in this case are
pre-contractual statements that were not embodied in the Agreement. I decline
to accept defendant's argument because, as noted earlier, Baker & Taylor's
(alleged) misrepresentations and omissions with respect to LibreDigital (both
the true nature of its relationship and its intention to develop a competitive
digital distribution platform) relate directly to Section 10.1 and Schedule J of
the Agreement and, indeed, go to the very core of the Agreement between
OverDrive and Baker & Taylor. Such material misrepresentations and
omissions in the Agreement-if proven to be true-frustrate the very purpose
and nature of the Agreement, and OverDrive purportedly would not have
entered into the Agreement with Baker & Taylor otherwise. Although the
language of the anti-reliance clause in the Agreement is clear and
unambiguous, I conclude that it is barred by public policy at this stage,
construing facts and inferences in plaintiffs favor and accepting the allegations






between the two parties. It was alleged in the
complaint that that wasn't true, and that in fact
one of the joint ventures had an arrangement
with someone else and it was by no means
exclusive. In taking up that allegation, the
court reaffirmed the holding in ABRY, but held
that the ABRY holding did not go so far as to
insulate contracting parties from intentional
misrepresentation, or lying, with respect to
provisions that are actually in the contract
itself, at least at the pleading stage. In other
words, you cannot fraudulently induce
someone to waive a claim for fraudulent
inducement.
I think that Delaware and Texas have similar
principles applicable to entire agreement and
non-reliance provisions.
D. Survival ofRepresentations; Indemnity
BYRON EGAN:
(Moderator)
The entire agreement and non-reliance
provisions tie into the indemnification
provisions. Anytime you are dealing with a
negotiated purchase of a closely held business,
the indemnification provisions are going to be
key provisions in your agreement. In the
Proposed Agreement, we have a provision that
the representation and warranties will survive
the closing. There are specific
85. Section 11.1 of the Proposed Agreement provides as follows:
11.1 Survival
All representations, warranties, covenants, and obligations in this Agreement,
the Disclosure Letter, the supplements to the Disclosure Letter, the certificates
delivered pursuant to Section 2.7, and any other certificate or document
delivered pursuant to this Agreement shall survive the Closing and the
consummation of the Contemplated Transactions, subject to Section 11.7. The
right to indemnification, reimbursement, or other remedy based on such
representations, warranties, covenants and obligations shall not be affected by
any investigation (including any environmental investigation or assessment)
conducted with respect to, or any Knowledge acquired (or capable of being
acquired) at any time, whether before or after the execution and delivery of this
2012] 805
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
indemnification provisions for
misrepresentations, for liabilities that were
associated with the business that were not
assumed, and for any liabilities arising out of
the operation of the business before the
closing.86  There are provisions dealing with
Agreement or the Closing Date, with respect to the accuracy or inaccuracy of or
compliance with, any such representation, warranty, covenant or obligation.
The waiver of any condition based on the accuracy of any representation or
warranty, or on the performance of or compliance with any covenant or
obligation, will not affect the right to indemnification, reimbursement, or other
remedy based on such representations, warranties, covenants and obligations.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 203.
86. Section 11.2 of the Proposed Agreement provides:
11.2 Indemnification and Reimbursement by Seller and Shareholders
Seller and each Shareholder, jointly and severally, will indemnify and hold
harmless Buyer, and its Representatives, shareholders, subsidiaries, and Related
Persons (collectively, the "Buyer Indemnified Persons"), and will reimburse
the Indemnified Persons, for any loss, liability, claim, damage, expense
(including costs of investigation and defense and reasonable attorneys' fees and
expenses) or diminution of value, whether or not involving a Third Party Claim
(collectively, "Damages"), arising from or in connection with:
(a) any Breach of any representation or warranty made by Seller or either
Shareholder in (i) this Agreement (without giving effect to any supplement
to the Disclosure Letter), (ii) the Disclosure Letter, (iii) the supplements to
the Disclosure Letter, (iv) the certificates delivered pursuant to Section 2.7
(for this purpose, each such certificate will be deemed to have stated that
Seller's and Shareholders' representations and warranties in this
Agreement fulfill the requirements of Section 7.1 as of the Closing Date as
if made on the Closing Date without giving effect to any supplement to the
Disclosure Letter, unless the certificate expressly states that the matters
disclosed in a supplement have caused a condition specified in Section 7.1
not to be satisfied), (v) any transfer instrument or (vi) any other certificate,
document, writing or instrument delivered by Seller or either Shareholder
pursuant to this Agreement;
(b) any Breach of any covenant or obligation of Seller or either
Shareholder in this Agreement or in any other certificate, document,
writing or instrument delivered by Seller or either Shareholder pursuant to
this Agreement;
(c) any Liability arising out of the ownership or operation of the Assets
prior to the Effective Time other than the Assumed Liabilities;
(d) any brokerage or finder's fees or commissions or similar payments
based upon any agreement or understanding made, or alleged to have been
made, by any Person with Seller or either Shareholder (or any Person
acting on their behalf) in connection with any of the Contemplated
Transactions;
(e) any product or component thereof manufactured by or shipped, or any
services provided by, Seller, in whole or in part, prior to the Closing Date;
(f) any matter disclosed in Parts of the Disclosure Letter;
(g) any noncompliance with any Bulk Sales Laws or fraudulent transfer
law in respect of the Contemplated Transactions;
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caps, baskets, limitations on the amount that
can be claimed, any deductibles from the
indemnification claims, and mechanisms for
asserting indemnification claims."
Don, you have a recent Delaware case where
Chancellor Strine has dealt with some of these
provisions?
DON WOLFE: The case is GRT v. Marathon GTF
(Delaware Counsel) Technology.88 It is a decision in July 2011 by
Chancellor Strine holding that a provision in a
joint venture contract" that specific
representations and warranties would survive
for one year and thereafter terminate, along
with any remedy for breach thereof, effectively
operated to shorten the statute of limitations
with respect to claims relating to those
representations. In so holding, Chancellor
Strine very helpfully addressed the effect of
several different, but typical kinds of
(h) any liability under the WARN Act or any similar state or local Legal
Requirement that may result from an "Employment Loss", as defined by
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6), caused by any action of Seller prior to the Closing
or by Buyer's decision not to hire previous employees of Seller;
(i) any Employee Plan established or maintained by Seller; or
(j) any Retained Liabilities.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 213-14.
87. See Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, 228-240.
88. GRT, Inc. v. Marathon GTF Technology, LTD, No. 5571-CS, 2011 WL
2682898 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2011) (Delaware Chancellor Strine in granting a motion to
dismiss held that a provision in a joint venture contract that particular representations
would survive for one year, and thereafter terminate along with any remedy for breach
thereof, effectively operated to shorten the statute of limitations with respect to claims
relating to those representations).
89. The survival provision at issue in GRT read as follows:
The representations and warranties of the Parties contained in Sections 3.1, 3.3,
3.6, 4.1 and 4.2 shall survive the Closing indefinitely, together with any
associated right of indemnification pursuant to Section 7.2 or 7.3. The
representations and warranties of [GRT] contained in Section 3.16 shall survive
until the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations . . . , and will
thereafter terminate, together with any associated right of indemnification
pursuant to Section 7.3. All other representations and warranties in Sections 3
and 4 will survive for twelve (12) months after the Closing Date, and will
thereafter terminate, together with any associated right of indemnification
pursuant to Section 7.2 or 7.3 or the remedies provided pursuant to Section 7.4.
Id. at *7.
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provisions that are included in agreements like
the Proposed Agreement. First, a provision
that the representations and warranties
terminate upon closing, which he indicated
means that they can no longer provide any
basis post-closing for a suit for
misrepresentation. Second, a provision for a
discreet survival period during which
representations and warranties will continue to
be binding on the party who made them, the
effect of this being to limit the time period
during which a claim for breach may be filed.90
Third, a provision that representations and
warranties survive indefinitely, which means
that the applicable statute of limitations period
applies. The general rule to be gleaned from
GRT is that when representations and
warranties terminate, so does the right to sue
on those representations and warranties, and
secondly, that you cannot extend the applicable
statute of limitations period beyond that which
is in effect by contract under any
circumstances, so the maximum amount of
time that you are going to have to claim
indemnification is the legal statute of
limitations period.
BYRON EGAN: An asset purchase agreement typically has
(Moderator) baskets or deductibles that must be exceeded
before any indemnification is owed by the
seller,9 1 caps on the maximum amount of
90. Some state statutes limit the ability of parties to limit by contract the applicable
statutory statute of limitations. See, e.g., TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.070 (2010)
("[A] person may not enter into a stipulation.. .or agreement that purports to limit the
time in which to bring suit [thereon] to a period shorter than two years [and one that
does] is void in this state"; provided that the foregoing "does not apply to a
stipulation.. .or agreement relating to the sale or purchase of a business entity if a party
[thereto] pays or receives or is obligated to pay or entitled to receive consideration
[thereunder] having an aggregate value of not less than $500,000.").
91. Section 11.5 of the Proposed Agreement provides a deductible for certain kinds
of claims as follows:
11.5 Limitations on Amount-Seller and Shareholders
Seller and Shareholders shall have no liability (for indemnification or
otherwise) with respect to claims under Section 11.2(a) until the total of all
808 [Vol. 116:3
PRIVATE COMPANY ACQUISITIONS
damages that can be claimed,92 and the periods
for asserting claims. 9 3 A buyer is going to say,
Damages with respect to such matters exceeds $ , and then
only for the amount by which such Damages exceed $_.
However, this Section 11.5 will not apply to claims under Section 11 .2(b)
through (i) or to matters arising in respect of Sections 3.9, 3.11, 3.14, 3.22,
3.29, 3.30, 3.31 or 3.32 or to any Breach of any of Seller's and Shareholders'
representations and warranties of which the Seller had Knowledge at any time
prior to the date on which such representation and warranty is made or any
intentional Breach by Seller or either Shareholder of any covenant or
obligation, and Seller and the Shareholders will be jointly and severally liable
for all Damages with respect to such Breaches.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 228. Section 11.5 provides a safety net, or
"basket," with respect to specified categories of indemnification, but does not establish a
ceiling, or "cap." The basket is a minimum amount that must be exceeded before any
indemnification is owed-in effect, it is a deductible. The purpose of the basket or
deductible is to recognize that representations concerning an ongoing business are
unlikely to be perfectly accurate and to avoid disputes over insignificant amounts. In
addition, the buyer can point to the basket as a reason why specific representations do not
need materiality qualifications.
A more aggressive buyer may wish to provide for a "threshold" deductible
(sometimes called a "tipping basket") that, once crossed, entitles the indemnified party to
recover all damages, rather than merely the excess over the basket. A "threshold"
alternative provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) If the Closing occurs, Sellers shall have no liability with respect to claims
under Section 11.2(a) until the aggregate of all Losses suffered by all Buyer
Indemnified Persons with respect to such claims exceeds $;
provided, however, that if the aggregate of all such Losses exceeds
$ , Sellers shall be liable for all such Losses.
Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, at 228. In the Proposed Agreement, the
representations are generally not subject to materiality qualifications, and the full dollar
amount of damages caused by a breach must be indemnified, subject to the effect of the
basket established by Section 11.5. This framework avoids "double dipping" in which a
seller contends that the breach exists only to the extent that it is material, and then the
material breach is subjected to the deduction of the basket. If the acquisition agreement
contains materiality qualifications to the seller's representations, the buyer may consider
a provision to the effect that such a materiality qualification will not be taken into
account in determining the magnitude of the damages occasioned by the breach for
purposes of calculating whether they are applied to the basket; otherwise, the immaterial
items may be material in the aggregate, but not applied to the basket.
92. The sellers' argument for a maximum indemnifiable amount is that they had
limited liability as shareholders and should be in no worse position with the seller having
sold the assets than they were in before the seller sold the assets; this argument may not
be persuasive to a buyer that views the assets as a component of its overall business
strategy or intends to invest additional capital. If a maximum amount is established, it
often does not apply to certain kinds of claims, such as liabilities for taxes, environmental
matters, or ERISA matters, for which the buyer may have liability under applicable law,
or defects in the ownership of the purchased assets. Separate limits may be negotiated for
different kinds of liabilities.
93. Section 11.7 of the Proposed Agreement provides as follows:
11.7 Time Limitations
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we will agree to those things, but we are going
to have an exception for fraud.9 4 Fraud comes
in a variety of flavors, so what you mean
should be defined. Is it a constructive fraud?
Is it intentional fraud? Is it negligent
misrepresentation, which is in specie of fraud?
What is it? If a party is going to be forced to
agree to a fraud exception, then consider
defining what you mean. For example, do you
mean a deliberate misrepresentation so you get
away from negligence? Does it have to be
material? Does it have to have been relied
upon by the other party? These are sensitive
issues that will need to be considered at
another time.
Our time has come to an end. We thank you
for your attention.
(a) If the Closing occurs, Seller and Shareholders will have liability (for
indemnification or otherwise) with respect to any Breach of (i) a covenant or
obligation to be performed or complied with prior to the Closing Date (other
than those in Sections 2.1 and 2.4(b) and Articles 10 and 12, as to which a
claim may be made at any time) or (ii) a representation or warranty (other than
those in Sections 3.9, 3.14, 3.16, 3.22, 3.29, 3.30, 3.31 and 3.32 as to which a
claim may be made at any time), but only if on or before ,
20 Buyer notifies Seller or Shareholders of a claim specifying the factual
basis of the claim in reasonable detail to the extent then known by Buyer.
(b) If the Closing occurs, Buyer will have liability (for indemnification or
otherwise) with respect to any Breach of (i) a covenant or obligation to be
performed or complied with prior to the Closing Date (other than those in
Article 12, as to which a claim may be made at any time) or (ii) a
representation or warranty (other than that set forth in Section 4.4, as to which a
claim may be made at any time), but only if on or before ,
20 Seller or Shareholders notify Buyer of a claim specifying the factual basis
of the claim in reasonable detail to the extent then known by Seller or
Shareholders.
Acquisition Agreements, supra note 8, at 230-31.
94. In Ameristar Casinos, Inc. v. Resorts International, Inc., No. 3685-VCS, 2010
WL 1875631 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2010), an indemnity cap provision said that it was
inapplicable "in the event of fraud or any willful breach of the representation" and
plaintiff claimed a willful breach of the tax representation because defendant had
received notice of a 248% increase in the ad valorem tax valuation of defendant's
principal asset-a casino-which would inevitably lead to a substantial increase in the ad
valorem taxes on it, and the court found this was sufficient pleading of both actual fraud
and willful breach of representations so as to avoid the indemnity cap for purposes of
denial of a motion to dismiss.
95. See Acquisition Agreement, supra note 8, 267-69.
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